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UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL TAX
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GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, A UTOPIAN BEPS
ALTERNATIVE
Henry Ordower*
Abstract
Under the guise of compelling multinational enterprises (MNEs) to pay their fair
share of income taxes, the OECD and other multinational agencies have introduced
proposals to prevent MNEs from eroding the income tax base of developed economies by
continuing to shift income artificially to low or zero tax jurisdictions. Some of the
proposals have garnered substantial multinational support, including recent support from
the new U.S. presidential administration for a global minimum tax. This Article reviews
many of those international proposals. The proposals tend to concentrate the incremental
tax revenue from the prevention of base erosion into the treasuries of the developed
economies although the minimum tax proposal known as GloBE encourages low tax
countries to adopt the minimum rate. The likelihood that zero tax countries will transition
successfully to imposing the minimum tax seems uncertain.
Developed economies lack a compelling moral claim to incremental revenue so
this Article argues that collecting a fair tax from MNEs and other taxpayers should be a
goal that is independent of claims on that revenue. This Article maintains that to prevent
tax base erosion, the income tax base and administration must be uniform across national
borders and the Article recommends applying uniform rules administered by an
international taxing agency. The Article explores the convergence of tax rules under such
an international taxing agency.
Distribution of tax revenue by the international agency should follow
contextualized need. In addressing the conundrum of absolute poverty in the undeveloped
and developing world vis á vis relative poverty in the developed world, the Article proposes
that the taxing agency should distribute all incremental revenue from the uniform tax where
the need is greatest to ameliorate absolute poverty and improve living standards without
regard to income source. The location of income production, destination of the produced
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goods and services generating the income, and residence of the income producers should
not determine the tax revenue distribution. Rather, the use of contextualized need for
distribution determination will enable developed economies to receive sufficient revenue
to maintain their existing infrastructures and governmental services. Developed
economies should forego new revenue, for which they have not budgeted, in favor of
improving worldwide living conditions for all. The proposals for uniform, worldwide
taxation and revenue sharing based on contextualized need are admittedly aspirational
and utopian but designed to encourage debate on sharing of resources in our increasingly
globalized world.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
International tax reform projects, including the OECD1 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) iterations, seek to collect additional tax from multi-national enterprises
(MNEs) under the rubric of fairer taxation. The reform projects propose various methods
of reallocating income that taxpayers have sourced to low and zero tax jurisdictions to
affluent developed economies for those economies to tax under their own tax regimes.
Such reallocations would concentrate the bulk of incremental tax revenue into the
treasuries of affluent developed economies.
This Article maintains that the need to prevent taxpayers from avoiding payment
of a fair tax amount should not result in additional tax revenue primarily for the
economically developed economies. Arguments that the right to tax belongs to the
developed economies are largely political, not moral. The arguments lack persuasive force
in a world of unequal distribution of wealth and resources with which to generate wealth.
Fair tax collection should yield incremental revenue to eliminate poverty and improve
living conditions for all people worldwide. Current international tax reform projects fail
to address world poverty adequately.
The Article proposes as an alternative to other international projects the creation
of an international taxing agency to substitute for national taxing agencies worldwide. The
1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a member
organization with 37 developed countries as members. Member Countries, OECD, https://www.oecd
.org/about/document/list-oecd-member-countries.htm [https://perma.cc/NHD4-A3BM] (last visited
May 21, 2020).
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international taxing agency would target elimination of world poverty. The new agency
would have full authority to collect income taxes from entities and individuals under
uniform international, rather than disparate national, taxing rules and procedures and to
distribute the revenue worldwide. This international taxing agency would render obsolete
most or all international tax reform projects and eliminate the need for most or all tax
treaties and tax information exchange agreements.
Uniform rules and rates applicable to all income worldwide without regard to the
source, residence, or market from or in which the income is produced will facilitate the
collection of an aggregate worldwide tax greater in amount than that currently collected by
all the fragmented, national tax collection. Unlike existing national tax systems, such a
tax, owing to its uniformity, would not favor some taxpayers over others.
Since the global tax will increase tax revenue collection materially, distribution
initially might follow a two-step formula. The first step would hold each country harmless
from tax revenue loss so that following transition to the global tax, each country receives
a share of tax revenue equal to its revenue from income tax in the preceding year, or an
average of several years’ collections, possibly adjusted for inflation, and enable each
country to maintain its infra- and superstructure. The second step would follow a needsbased assessment under which the nutrition, housing, education, healthcare and
infrastructure needs of less developed countries would be evaluated and a plan developed
to ameliorate deficits in all categories worldwide. The agency would distribute incremental
tax revenue pursuant to that plan. The second step would devote incremental revenue to
the gradual elimination of those deficits – perhaps addressing life-threatening deficits first,
followed by improvement of living standards everywhere. Tax revenue thus transferred to
non-affluent, developing economies initially would be small relative to the amount of
revenue distributed under the first step to enable developed economies to maintain their
existing infra- and superstructures, but poverty amelioration costs would be moderated as
a function of relative local cost of goods and labor. Nevertheless, the amount of tax revenue
devoted to international poverty relief would be far greater than the minimal amounts
developed economies currently contribute to world poverty eradication.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II contextualizes the problem of base erosion
against revenue collection and distribution and provides an overview of the international
taxing issues that this Article addresses. Part III considers a U.S. regional context as a
microcosm in which multiple and often overlapping taxing jurisdictions compete for
revenue and investment. Some seek to capture additional revenue by annexing high tax
yield property, and others with extra tax and, at times, predatory revenue collection. Many
exchange tax concessions for development and highlight the problems of tax competition
and proliferating taxing jurisdictions even in the face of centralized tax collection. This
part presents a relatively complex proxy for the revenue-raising problems confronting
multiple taxing jurisdictions that fail to coordinate their efforts despite the umbrella of a
larger governmental unit to which they belong. Part IV reviews a variety of proposals and
related commentary—BEPS, GloBE, CCCTB—highlighting the difficulty of
harmonization in the face of tax competition and relentless industry pressure for taxfavored treatment. Part V introduces the factor of relative and absolute poverty and
regional development needs that contribute to the proliferation of taxing concessions in
exchange for international investment, even where the benefit from the inbound investment
is compromised by the loss of potential tax revenue and the corrupt reallocation of the
potential revenue into private hands. Part VI envisions relinquishment of national tax
sovereignty in favor of an international taxing agency with the power to assess and collect
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tax at a uniform rate or rates under uniform international taxing rules without regard to
source, residence, or sales. It would base the authority to tax on multiple independent
factors so that virtually all income is included and taxed in the worldwide base the
international agency administers. Part VII recommends negotiation of revenue shares to
dissuade regions from tax competition. It also suggests constructing a framework for
formulaic revenue distribution based on relative economic need, including the maintenance
of existing infrastructures. Part VIII concludes and acknowledges that the Article’s
proposals indeed are utopian and remain distant from capturing immediate, worldwide
acceptance of an international taxing agency. Nevertheless, the Article’s proposals are
intended to motivate further international conversation of the critical need for tax base
convergence in support of uniform taxation—even if only a minimum tax—and provide a
model for global distribution of incremental revenue from uniform taxation to ameliorate
global economic needs rather than further enriching the world’s developed economies.
II.
CONTEXTUALIZING THE GLOBAL TAXING PROBLEM
As corporations grew and increased their cross-border reach through the twentieth
century, they adapted to doing business in multiple jurisdictions under a single enterprise
umbrella. Such MNEs centralized their management, notwithstanding national borders.
Many were sufficiently flexible to disperse management functions by operation or
geography to maximize profitability although all functions remained answerable to central
management. 2 The MNE’s international business models enabled them to situate
operations where costs were lowest or regional features most favorable for specific
business functions. MNEs flexed their economic muscle to encourage robust, interjurisdictional, and international competition for their investment. From time to time, the
competition became destructive to the host jurisdiction because the fervor to meet such
competition sometimes caused the host jurisdiction to relinquish resources exceeding the
benefits received from the investment. Taxation became a mainstay of that competition.
MNEs demanded and received tax concessions from a jurisdiction before making or
increasing their investments in the jurisdiction.
Governments have not been nearly so nimble in adjusting their tax systems to
capture revenue from the MNEs. Neither have governments adopted a unified or
harmonized approach to taxation, even though compromising their taxing sovereignty with
harmonized tax rules and procedures might yield better tax revenue production. Instead,
tax competition has trended both on project-specific items as a substitute for direct
subsidies and, on the broader scale, to encourage relocation of some or all of the MNEs’
activities from higher tax jurisdictions to jurisdictions that would offer substantially lower
or even zero tax rates in exchange for investment. And it is not only MNEs to which
nations have offered tax-based investment incentives. Jurisdictions commonly offer

2

OECD, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY—HEAVILY DEBATED
HARDLY MEASURED (May 2018), https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/MNEs-in-the-globaleconomy-policy-note.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC28-ZQCG] (activities undertaken by foreign affiliated
MNEs grew by $13 trillion from 2000 to 2014); Mark J. Perry, Many Large US Firms Sell, Hire, and
Invest More Overseas than in US and Have to Think Globally to Survive, AM. ENTER. INST. (June 22,
2020),
https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/many-large-us-firms-sell-hire-and-invest-more-overseasthan-in-the-us-and-have-to-think-globally-to-survive/ [https://perma.cc/Y4BB-TLRF] (U.S. Based
companies in the world’s top 100 multinational companies have foreign assets accounting for 23.8%
to 82.4% of their total assets, and foreign employment accounting for 23.8% to 87.9% of their total
employment).
BUT
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immigrant or resident visas to investors3 and have begun to include temporary tax holidays
as additional immigration incentives.4
Higher tax jurisdictions have not conceded their right to tax the MNEs, but they
have found resourceful tax planners and competitive taxing jurisdictions to be formidable
foes. Efforts to overcome tax competition and planning have enjoyed limited success.
Regarding the income tax, combatting tax planning and tax competition (with some
exceptions)5 has been largely national. Some tools that legislatures and tax administrators
deploy to staunch loss of revenue from competition, such as general anti-avoidance rules,
have been enacted into law in similar forms in numerous jurisdictions, 6 reflecting
legislative willingness to borrow tax concepts from other jurisdictions and adapt them to
address challenging problems.7
The OECD has assumed the lead in the international tax arena and, for the past
several decades, has supplemented tax treaties 8 with other multinational tools for tax
collectors to share tax information in the form of similar, but more limited, international
agreements.9 As in the case of treaties, 10 exchange of information through tax agency
cooperation may facilitate tax offender prosecution. More recently, the OECD introduced
and developed several projects designed to identify and capture individuals’ and MNEs’
income that they have assigned artificially to low tax jurisdictions.11 In one project, the
OECD sought to coerce low tax jurisdictions to step back from encouraging taxpayers to
move investment from high tax jurisdictions to low tax ones and to cooperate in exchanging
tax information so that jurisdictions could tax their resident taxpayers on income received
3 See Leila Adim, Between Benefit and Abuse: Immigrant Investment Programs, 62 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 121 (2017); Allison Christians, Buying In: Residence and Citizenship by Investment,
62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 51 (2017).
4 E.g., Raul-Angelo Papotti & Lorenzo Ferro, Italy’s Attractive New Tax Regime for
Wealthy Pensioners, 94 TAX NOTES INT'L 443 (Apr. 29, 2019); Marco Q. Rossi, Italy’s Special Tax
Regime for High-Net-Worth Individuals, Three Years In, 98 TAX NOTES INT'L 1145 (June 8, 2020).
5 See discussion infra Part III.
6 General Anti-avoidance Rules (GAARs) have become commonplace although effective
use has been limited. See Rebecca Prebble & John Prebble, Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance
Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study, 55 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 21, 25-27 (2010). The U.S. does not have a GAAR scheme but the statutory economic
substance rule in section 7701(o) operates similarly to other countries’ GAARs and requires that a
transaction have economic substance independent of its tax benefits, although the government
appears to have used that section, as well as a specific partnership anti-avoidance regulation primarily
as additional arguments in litigation (although both may have had impact on settlements with
taxpayers. See I.R.C. § 7701(o); Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2. Similarly, controlled foreign corporation
(CFC) anti-avoidance rules similar to those in section 951 have been enacted in several jurisdictions.
See I.R.C. § 951.
7 See Anthony Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 253 (2003).
8 See, e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Can., Sep. 26,
1980, 1469 U.N.T.S. 189 (tax treaty based on OECD model).
9 Tax Information Exchange Agreements, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-oftax-information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm [https://perma.cc/43XU-6V55] (last
visited June 17, 2020) [hereinafter TIEA]; Automatic Exchange Portal, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/BL26-7UHF] (last visited June 17,
2020) (collaboration between OECD and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes in area of automatic exchange information with respect to Common
Reporting Standard).
10 See, e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital art. XXVII, U.S.Can., Sep. 26, 1980, 1469 U.N.T.S. 189).
11 See infra Part III.
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in other jurisdictions where appropriate.12 The OECD developed a list of un-cooperative
tax havens and gradually removed jurisdictions from the list as they agreed to respect
OECD standards of transparency and exchange of information.13 It removed the last three
countries, Andorra, Monaco and Liechtenstein, from the list in May 2009.14 The European
Union (EU) maintains its own active list of uncooperative tax jurisdictions that currently
includes eleven island jurisdictions and Oman.15
More recent projects focus on MNE revenue and seek to reallocate the revenue
from the source to which the taxpayer has assigned it to a higher tax jurisdiction through
sourcing rules designed to diminish the ability of taxpayers to shift profit artificially from
high to low tax jurisdictions. 16 A working group under the European Commission
introduced a voluntary proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax basis (CCCTB)
that, if adopted, would apportion the income of MNEs formulaically and predictably
among the EU states in which they are operating.17 After tabling the proposal earlier, the
EC renewed the proposal in 2015 as a mandatory base with a gradual introduction.18 The
EU also has become more attentive to the state aid issues prohibited by the Treaty of the
Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 19 when its member states grant non-uniform tax
concessions to enterprises to provide a welcoming tax environment for them.20

12

OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 16 (1998),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/harmful/1904176.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AF4Y-X76D]
(identifying
harmful tax practices and tax havens to encourage developed countries to abandon such practices and
impose sanctions on tax haven jurisdictions facilitating secret investment from residents of developed
economies using tax havens to avoid home country taxes) [hereinafter OECD HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION].
13
List
of Unco-operative
Tax
Havens,
OECD, https://www.oecd.org
/countries/monaco/list-of-unco-operative-tax-havens.htm [https://perma.cc/NHM5-L968] (last
visited June 17, 2020) [hereinafter OECD, Unco-operative Tax Havens]. But see Michael J.
McIntyre, How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 255 (Oct. 26,
2009) (arguing against the effectiveness of the TIEA as a basis on which to remove jurisdictions from
the list of tax havens, characterizing the U.S. - Switzerland agreement as changing little of the Swiss
bank secrecy-based assistance to international tax cheats, and proposing an alternative).
14 OECD, Unco-operative Tax Havens, supra note 13.
15 Council Conclusions on the Revised EU List of Non-cooperative Jurisdictions for Tax
Purposes, 2020 O.J. (C 64) 8 [hereinafter EU List of Non-cooperative Jurisdictions]
16 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS), OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/
[https://perma.cc/TM94-6GRP] (last visited July 10, 2020); MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX ET AL., OXFORD
CTR. BUS. TAX’N., THE OECD GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION (GLOBE) PROPOSAL 1-2 (2020).
17 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, COM
(2011) 121 final (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 CCCTB Proposal].
18 European Comm’n Memoranda MEMO/15/5174, The Commission, Questions and
Answers on the CCCTB Re-launch (June 17, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission
/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5174 [https://perma.cc/E3J5-3FG6] [hereinafter Q&A CCCTB].
19 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union art. 107,
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.
20
State Aid Control, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/competition
/state_aid/overview/index_en.html [https://perma.cc/7XC3-PCAJ] (last visited July 10, 2020)
(identifying tax relief as form of prohibited state aid).
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Whether the target of legislation or a multinational) project is the individual,21 the
MNE, or both, 23 the legislative or project objective almost invariably is to measure
income and source in a manner that disregards artificial or manipulative sourcing. A
frequent indicium of such artificiality or manipulation is a related party transaction where
the parties are in different taxing jurisdictions and the pricing shifts profit to low or no-tax
jurisdictions. While reallocation of income by the tax collector under existing transfer
pricing regulations and guidelines currently is possible, 24 existing transfer pricing
regulations have proven to be inadequate in restraining tax base erosion and accompanying
profit shifting. Were existing transfer pricing regulation adequate, the BEPS projects
would have been unnecessary. Underlying the reallocation process is the perception that
the individual or MNE is manipulating income source and underpaying tax rather than
simply paying tax to the wrong jurisdiction. However, with the possible exception of the
CCCTB which would apportion the income tax base among the EU countries in which the
MNE operates under a uniform set of rules in an endeavor to prevent double taxation and
no taxation of income, 25 an objective shared with most tax treaties, 26 the international
projects developed by the OECD and national anti-avoidance rules27 reallocate income to
the developed economies with relatively high corporate tax rates 28 rather than to less
developed or developing economies. While the OECD projects purport to be neutral in
identifying correct income source, reallocation favors the developed economy
jurisdictions. From the OECD approach, one concludes that the underpayment of tax is
significant because it deprives the treasury of a developed economy of tax revenue owed
to it. If the projects increase the tax revenue of developed economies, however, they are
likely to decrease investment that less developed economies may have captured with low
taxes and tax incentives.
22

21 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), Pub L 111-147, 124 Stat. 97 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. §§ 1471-1474, 6038D) (imposing penalties and sanctions
for failing to report accounts and income of U.S. persons); I.R.C. § 877A (expatriation tax on U.S.
persons who relinquish citizenship or permanent residence in the U.S.), for example.
22 See I.R.C. § 7874 (taxing inverting entities that cease to be U.S. entities); 2011 CCCTB
Proposal, supra note 17. See also, e.g., BEPS, supra note 16.
23 See Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) provisions under section 951 in the U.S.
I.R.C. § 951. See also, for example, similar provisions in other countries taxing some or all corporate
income to the corporation’s shareholders. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 6.
24 Cf. I.R.C. § 482 ( “[T]he Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses”);
I.R.C. § 59A(b) (the base erosion minimum tax imposing a minimum 10 percent tax on deductible
amounts paid between related parties). See also I.R.C. § 267A (the disallowance of deductions in
hybrid transactions when not matched with an inclusion).
25 See 2011 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 17.
26
Tax treaties include prevention of double taxation among other functions in their title.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS 99, 99 (K. P. Sauvant and L. E. Sachs eds., 2009).
27 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 951 (CFC provisions).
28 High rate of tax is a relative term. The U.S. reduced its corporate income tax rate from
a maximum of 35% to 21% in 2018 and imposed a maximum rate of 50% as recently as 1985. Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of I.R.C.); I.R.C. § 11 (1982). See also Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates,
Income Years 1909-2012, TAX FOUND., https://taxfoundation.org/federal-corporate-income-taxrates-income-years-1909-2012/ [https://perma.cc/JHX6-G9LR].
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For all taxpayers, including MNEs, the level of taxation may be a key but not the
only economic factor in the analysis of where to earn income. Choosing where to locate
income-producing activity involves a bundle of economic and non-economic factors. Tax
rules often are ambiguous and economically favor certain jurisdictions, but the ambiguity
also might lead to multiple tax impositions. Tax rules are not alone in their ambiguity. The
location of income-producing activity is also ambiguous, even more so today, when
intangible, digital property produces income without any clear link to a specific and
identifiable source, even with a single factor of destination of consumption as
determinative. Destination is an inadequate proxy for taxing all income insofar as it
concentrates income in high consumption destinations. High consumption tends to
coincide with a country’s level of development because increases in consumption generally
correlate with increases in disposable income. 29 Similarly, residence of the income
producer is often uncertain and residence of the owners of an income producing entity may
not be more certain as one must unpeel possible layers of ownership.30 While taxpayers
may complain that the tax rules are uncertain, they exploit the ambiguity of income source
to locate income where the level of taxation is lowest rather than where income-producing
activity takes place. Splitting genuine economic activity source from tax source enables
taxpayers to minimize taxation artificially without there being certainty as to a single
genuine source. Competing, legitimate claims of source may belong to multiple
jurisdictions. Undoubtedly the income should be taxable somewhere. Ideally, if all income
everywhere were subject to identical tax rules and rates, the taxpayer would be indifferent
as to income source and would make location decisions based on non-tax factors.
Commentators have expressed concern that enhanced tax capture from MNEs
favors the advanced economies unduly.31 Those commentators who critique the income
shift for taxing purposes to developed economy jurisdictions argue that the BEPS projects
fail to allocate a sufficiently large share of the income tax base to less-developed
jurisdictions. This literature suggests other “fairer” methods for allocating or apportioning
the tax base. One approach recommends a modified view of value creation and suggests
allocating more of the base to where value is created. 32 Another offers a method of
formulary apportionment of the income tax base that includes a labor factor in the formula,
not as a function of wages, but rather as a function of person-hours of work to prevent wage

29

See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Destination Based Corporate Tax: An Alternative Approach,
(Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch, Working Paper No. 529, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2883835 [https://perma.cc/2VF5-LEUK]; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah &
Kimberly A. Clausing, Problems with Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint,
(Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch, Working Paper No. 16-029, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2884903 [https://perma.cc/Q2GJ-TJSC]; Wei Cui, Destination-Based
Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal, 67 U. TORONTO. L.J. 301 (2017) (critical analysis of
destination-based cash flow taxation); Salesfactor.org, Comment Letter on Sales Factor Formulary
Apportionment of Global Profits as an Alternative System of Taxation of to the Current U.S. Federal
Corporate Income Tax (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sales
%20Factor_Redacted3.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CNP-2C3H].
30 Robert J Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen Shay, Defending Worldwide Taxation
with a Shareholder-Based Definition of Corporate Residence, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1681, 1683-84
(2016).
31 See DEVEREUX ET AL., supra note 16.
32 Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, Taxing Income Where Value is Created,
22 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2018).
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differentials from distorting apportionment formulas in favor of high wage countries.33 A
third would allocate tax base by the benefit received by investment destination rather than
the benefit received from the destination by the investor.34
The goal for the OECD and the governments in developed economies has been
primarily sourcing income to developed economies so that it may be taxed there under that
jurisdiction’s tax regime. The more general proposition that each MNE (and each
individual, as well) should pay an identifiable and specific portion of their income in tax
without regard to which nation receives the tax has not been prominent. If worldwide
agreement on an ideal amount of tax and uniform tax rules were possible, as this Article
will recommend, rather than the sourcing or mis-sourcing of income, the next step would
be allocation of the tax revenue among jurisdictions. Artificial sourcing would not alter
the amount of tax payable by any taxpayer or related group of taxpayers.
While fairness certainly underlies the OECD’s BEPS projects, fairness there has
been primarily an income source concept, maintaining that if income is attributable to a
source, the source has priority in imposing its tax. Even under the U.S.’s worldwide
taxation of its citizens and residents,35 the U.S. has ceded taxing authority to the income
source country through the foreign tax credit. 36 Existing concepts of source favor
developed economies. Unless some innovative source concept might compensate for
imbalances in opportunities and resources worldwide by imputing more level distribution
of opportunities and resources and taxing income according to that imputed source, a
different manner of allocating worldwide taxing opportunity is critical to enable nonaffluent nations and regions to develop and provide a reasonable standard of living to all
people free from need.
It would be a significant conceptual shift to jettison the competitive concept of
source as the primary basis for international income taxation and adopt the more nuanced
and collaborative needs-based system this Article proposes. Despite the developed
economies’ income productivity, such a tax system would emphasize non-geographic
fairness in the distribution of resources. The international community would unite on tax
principles to prevent tax base erosion independent of source taxation so that the principles
would not overwhelmingly favor the advanced economies. Instead, the objective of the tax
system would be to generate adequate governmental resources to meet worldwide revenue
demands. Currently, developed economies devote less than one percent of their tax
revenue to development for less developed economies.37 International uniformity would
require MNEs (and other taxpayers) to pay some reasonable amount of tax on their income
and facilitate devotion of a larger amount of tax revenue to international development.
The focus of the tax principles would be on the question of whether a definable,
correct set of tax rules might exist under which each taxpayer pays a “fair” amount of tax
without regard to the jurisdictions in which the taxpayer operates. This Article emphasizes
33
Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions Toward a Grand Unified Global Income Tax, 14 FLA.
TAX REV. 361, 387 (2013) (labor factor in the income apportionment formula based on person hours
of work rather than payroll amounts).
34 Vasiliki Koukoulioti, The Benefit Principle Revisited – Avoiding the Repercussions of
Digitalization on the TaxBase Sustainability (May 29, 2020) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in
process, Queen Mary, University of London) (on file with author).
35 See I.R.C. § 61; Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (taxing U.S. citizens and residents on their income
from all sources worldwide).
36 I.R.C. § 901(a), (b)(1).
37 Alexis Brassey & Henry Ordower, The Village of Billionaires: Fair Taxation and
Redistribution Amid Relative and Absolute Poverty, 99 TAX NOTES INT'L 97 (July 6, 2020).
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the question of whether, assuming a “fair” measure of tax exists, distribution of that “fair”
amount among jurisdictions ought to follow determinations of need with the elimination
of suffering—starvation, disease, homelessness—at the forefront rather than the place of
production of income. The imposition of tax can be along ability to pay principles, while
distribution would follow contextualized need. This Article recommends abandoning the
premise that income and accompanying tax revenue, however it is measured, be allocated
to where the income is produced, in favor of allocating tax revenue based on a broad,
inclusive view of revenue that is need-determined to accommodate the systemic transition.
Developed economies would continue to have the greatest needs to meet their existing
commitments and maintain existing infra- and superstructures. Yet, the shift in distribution
principles would help address the uneven worldwide distribution of resources and level
disparities between affluent and non-affluent taxpayers and communities, especially those
disparities resulting in the absolute poverty prevalent in some parts of the world that
generate little income. 38 The revised system would preclude MNEs from using their
economic bargaining power to negotiate tax relief from developing economies that cannot
replace the lost revenue easily.
The common assertion by representatives of MNEs that MNEs do not seek to
reduce their taxes artificially,39 but plan the placement of their income to avoid becoming
subject to tax on the same unit 40 of income in multiple jurisdictions is consistent with
uniform tax rules and a fair rate of tax. Source planning may also protect MNEs from
suffering a tax-based, competitive disadvantage. As long as the MNE does not pay tax
while its competitors avoid tax leaving the MNE at a competitive disadvantage, the MNEs
are indifferent to reasonable levels of taxation. Transparent and uniform tax rules would
enable the MNEs to determine their tax liability to each jurisdiction correctly. Uniform
rules would require the MNEs’ competitors to similarly pay a correct amount of tax to each
jurisdiction. Taxpayers should not be subject to non-uniform tax rules in any taxing
jurisdiction.41 Yet, even if tax rules and rates are uniform within a taxing jurisdiction, they
are not currently uniform across jurisdictions, and MNEs deploy considerable resources to
minimizing their taxes whether as a competitive defense or as profit-centered activity.42
38

Id.
Ryan Finley, Uber Accepts Need for New International Tax System, TAX NOTES TODAY
GLOB. (June 26, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digitaleconomy/uber-accepts-need-new-international-tax-system/2020/06/26/2cnmn?highlight=Pillar
%201 [https://perma.cc/U3RM-L4W5]; Adrian Weckler & Michael Cogley, ‘No one did anything
wrong here and Ireland is being picked on... It is total political crap’ - Apple chief Tim Cook,
INDEPENDENT.IE (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/no-one-did-anythingwrong-here-and-ireland-is-being-picked-on-it-is-total-political-crap-apple-chief-tim-cook35012145.html [https://perma.cc/XLE9-84P5]. In a recent ruling by the General Court of the
European Union, the Court overruled the EC’s decision as the Court found that the EC had not met
the legal standard necessary to show that there was an economic advantage (state aid) as required by
Article 107(1) TFEU. See Case T-778/16 and T-892/16, Ireland v. European Comm’n, 2020 E.C.L.I.
338.
40 Except when referring to specific U.S. tax provisions for which the U.S. dollar will be
used, “unit” of income is the income measured in the functional currency of the income producing
entity.
41 When taxing rules do not treat all taxpayers the same, the taxing state is discriminating
among taxpayers, a possible violation of the state aid prohibition in the EU if the taxpayers are
residents or nationals of different states. TFEU art. 107. Likewise, states may not discriminate
between residents and non-residents in the U.S. Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612
(1985).
42 Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 47 (2010).
39
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Harmonization of taxation internationally under the rubric of a universally correct
level of tax is elusive. Efforts to achieve consensus on combatting tax avoidance may lead
to some multi-national agreements, but if each signatory gets to apply its own tax rules and
interpretations to the agreement, the force of the agreement diminishes. National
sovereignty remains a formidable, albeit primarily rhetorical,43 barrier to the best resolution
of many issues common to most nations. The recent COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the
difficulty of attaining international consensus on any matter; as little consensus exists even
on a common authority to combat a health threat to the entire world population. The
pandemic did not elicit an international call to deputize an existing World Health
Organization to design a method to contain the spread of the virus. Rather, each nation
and often each governmental sub-unit took its own politically determined approach with
considerable but limited harmonization of methods. On the tax side, the EU, despite being
a remarkable voluntary union of sovereign and historically often warring nations, has failed
to harmonize taxes except in setting a minimum value-added tax rate with incompletely
harmonized operating rules.44 The EU itself as a governmental unit lacks the power to tax,
although a nascent movement to grant limited taxing authority to a central EU government
along with a U.S.-type federalist model of overlapping state and central taxing authority
has begun to gather support among leading tax academics. 45 The task of broad-based
harmonization is formidable.
Like an earlier article recommending the creation of an international taxing agency
to apportion a global income base, 46 this Article argues that national sovereignty and
national self-interest remain impediments to fair taxation and must yield to the international
need for predictable taxation at a level fair to all. The Article recommends modified
international tax rules administered by a single international agency that collects and
distributes income tax revenue among sovereign states based on the contextualized revenue
needs of each state under international fairness-based principles.47 This Article inquires
whether the developed economies might deploy fairer tax revenue distribution to persuade
less developed economies to abandon tax competition and suggests possible coercive
devices to nudge voluntary abandonment of tax competition.48

43 Rhetorical insofar as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international
bodies cannot function successfully without relinquishment of national sovereignty. Cf. discussion
infra Part V.
44 Council Directive 2006/112, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EC Council
Directive].
There also has been some harmonization on a few customs matters. See
Regulation 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 Laying Down
the Union Customs Code 2013 O.J. (L269) 1.
45
See Op-Ed: European Solidarity Requires EU Taxes, EU L. LIVE (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-european-solidarity-requires-eu-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/K562-MD2T];
Frans Vanistendael, Apple: Why the EU Needs a Common Corporate Income Tax, 99 TAX NOTES
INT’L 451 (July 27, 2020).
46 Ordower, supra note 33.
47 Brassey & Ordower, supra note 37.
48 Alongside this paper’s proposal stands another somewhat more limited impingement on
national sovereignty in the form of a recent proposal for a uniform global excess profits tax to
complement national taxation of MNEs. Tarcisio Diniz Magalhaes & Allison Christians, Rethinking
Tax for the Digital Economy After COVID-19, 10 HARV. BUS. REV. (forthcoming
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3635907 [https://perma.cc/DT4X-8M5S].
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REGIONALISM AND TAXING JURISDICTIONS
With an estimated population of just under one million, 49 St. Louis County,
Missouri has eighty-nine independent municipalities with taxing authority, and the county
itself also may tax. Taxing authority is derivative of the state of Missouri’s taxing power50
guaranteed by the U.S. constitution. 51 The St. Louis County Collector of Revenue is
responsible for billing and collecting ad valorem real and personal property taxes for over
two hundred taxing districts in St. Louis County.52 The number of taxing districts is more
than twice the number of municipalities because the school, fire protection, sewer, and
municipal taxing districts are not co-extensive with municipalities but overlap in somewhat
mysterious and often historically determined ways, such that multiple school-taxing
districts, for example, may overlap the borders of a single municipality. Some districts are
funded better than others because real estate is more valuable in some parts of the county
and yields greater sums of real property tax revenue 53 than in other parts, and some
municipalities have more retail space generating more sales tax revenue than do others.
The state administers sales tax collection and distribution.
An owner of real property in St. Louis County examining their real estate tax bill
finds a confusing array of taxing districts imposing a portion of the total tax consolidated
into a single invoice. That array often differs from one property to another as district
borders for differing types of taxing districts do not coincide. Rates of tax also differ
among similar types of districts. The tax base, however, is uniform. Each property has a
value attributed to it, and each taxing district within which that property lies applies its tax
rate to that uniform value in determining the tax to impose. There is occasionally some
ambiguity when a multiple-use property is involved in determining what portion of the
property ought to be assessed at the commercial rather than the residential percentage and
appraised values of any property may be contested. The rules are uniform for assessing,
collecting, and distributing tax among taxing jurisdictions. The County administers the
tax, collects the tax payment, and is responsible for sanctions for non-payment including
seizure and sale of the property to collect unpaid taxes. Taxing districts neither administer
the tax, determine the value of the taxed property nor control sanctions for non-payment.
Uniformity in administration and collection is not unusual worldwide. The U.S. is
exceptional in the range of governmental units that have their own administrative
infrastructures devoted to tax collection.54 Most countries administer and collect income
49 St. Louis County, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/stlouiscountymissouri [https://perma.cc/G8P4-DKQH].
50 M . C
O ONST. art. X, § 1.
51 U.S. Const. amend. X.
52 See Collector of Revenue, ST. LOUIS CNTY. GOV., https://www.stlouisco.com
/YourGovernment/CountyDepartments/Revenue/CollectorOfRevenue
[https://perma.cc/2VVDH2QL] (last visited July 10, 2020).
53
Real property taxes are generally a percentage of the value of the property taxed under
rules that base the tax on an assessed value lower than the fair value of the property. For example,
the assessment formula in Missouri for residential property uses 19% of the appraised value of the
property as the base for real property tax. The percentage used for commercial property is 32% and
the percentage used for farm property is 12%. MO. STATE TAX COMM’N, PROPERTY REASSESSMENT
AND TAXATION PAMPHLET 4 (2017), https://stc.mo.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/01
/Property-Reassessment-Pamphlet-1-18-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5YS-7FZX] (last visited July 10,
2020).
54 Each state of the U.S. has its own taxing agency responsible for state income and
consumption taxes and municipalities and other taxing districts with their own agencies are not
unusual. See State Tax Agencies, FED’N TAX ADM’R, https://www.taxadmin.org/state-tax-agencies
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taxes, value-added taxes, and often property taxes, centrally.55 Rates of tax and property
values may vary regionally, but the central authority distributes the tax collected among
the regional governmental units providing services and often has responsibility for the
enforcement of taxes, even if local governments determine the expenditure of the tax
collected.
While the taxing district may set the rate applicable to the taxed property in St.
Louis County, state constitutional tax limitations require a public vote before a taxing
district may increase a tax rate,56 and initiatives to increase a tax might succeed in one
district but fail in another overlapping district. The multiplicity of rates and countydetermined property values means that the governmental services in one location may
differ significantly from the services in another geographically proximate area within the
County. Similarly, with respect to the state-administered sales tax, purchases of identical
items at identical prices in two stores near one another often incur different sales tax
amounts because the sales tax rates in proximate jurisdictions may differ. Rates of tax are
not harmonized, but the state constitution limits the rates municipalities and other taxing
districts may impose.57 The legislature may impose other limitations on permissible rates
separate from the constitutional limitations.58
The result of multiple taxing jurisdictions in a relatively small geographic area59 is
visible in the levels of school funding that impact the educational services for children in
St. Louis County.60 Some public-school districts become desirable places to live because
they offer well-funded, high-quality public education while others are lacking in quality
and even may fail to meet state educational standards.61 Educational disparities across St.
[https://perma.cc/Y5YV-9U4L]. For example, the city of St. Louis is not part of St. Louis County
and has its own collector of revenue responsible for the city earnings tax as well as ad valorem
property taxes. See supra note 52.
55 The EU member states collect most or all taxes centrally even where sub-jurisdictions
impose differing rates in addition to the national rate. See About Us, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue-customs/about (last visited June 26,
2020) (UK’s central tax, payments and customs authority); Institutional Information, AGENCIA
TRIBUTARIA, https://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT.internet/en_gb/Inicio/La_Agencia_Tributaria
/Informacion_institucional/Informacion_institucional.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q3AL-PF2V] (last
visited
June
26,
2020);
Irish
Tax
and
Customs,
REVENUE
COMM’RS,
https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/role-of-revenue/core-business.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7SR5-RJLF] (last visited June 26, 2020).
56 See MO. CONST. art. X, § 22; see also Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Tax Limits and the Future
of Local Democracy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1884 (2020).
57 See MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 8, 11 (limiting rates of tax on personal property and real
property, respectively).
58 See M . C
O ONST. art. X, § 10(c) (power of the legislature to limit tax).
59 See, for example, St. Louis County, which is less than one percent of the land area of
Missouri but has nearly 20 percent of the Missouri state population and more than three percent of
the state’s 6,000 special taxing districts. Sales Tax Jurisdiction Maps, MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
https://mogov.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=22cc45ec926e4f94a1f41027b1b
edb0e [https://perma.cc/6M5P-E9D8] (last visited July 10, 2020).
60 Quality of education of course is not solely a function of funding, but better funding
generally contributes to a better educational product.
61 In 2019, the County school districts of Brentwood and Jennings represent the extremes.
Measured by dollars per average daily attendance, Brentwood with $19,035 had nearly twice the
funding of the Jennings district with $10,676. Building Level Per Pupil Expenditures 2019 Report,
MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., https://stateofmissouri.app.box.com/s
/1nvymfovyruscbmcte1b8dn838mpndlh/file/573737767611 [https://perma.cc/3S2Q-AZYM] (last
visited June 17, 2020) [hereinafter 2019 Building Level Expenditure Report]. Brentwood is a midcounty district with a predominantly white enrollment. Jennings is a north county district with a
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Louis County are significant. In several municipalities, children living on opposite sides
of a street go to schools in different school districts and may have quite different
educational experiences from one another because one school district has greater resources
from tax revenue than the other. The school district disparities are somewhat selfperpetuating in that the perceived school district quality affects property values, causing
prices of single-family residences in better school districts to be greater than in lower
quality districts. Since real estate taxes are based on property value, higher value yields
more revenue, sometimes even if the tax rate is lower than in the lower quality school
district.
Where resource disparities exist among school districts, disparities in educational
quality tend to follow, often along racial lines. In Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 62 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the notion that segregated education could
provide equal education and prohibited purportedly “separate but equal” schools.
Remedies to level opportunities for children have proved elusive. In some states, federal
courts have intervened to address some educational disparities by ordering busing of
students across districts to remedy imbalances in the racial composition of student bodies
and afford lower-income people—often people of color—better educational opportunities
in districts that historically had little or no racial diversity.63 To settle a lawsuit, St. Louis
County school districts beginning in 1982 initiated a voluntary program busing black
students from overwhelmingly black St. Louis City schools to predominately white schools
in St. Louis County.64 Revenue sharing among districts or consolidation of districts so that
all pupils, even in a small county like St. Louis, are covered by identical amounts of tax
revenue per student has not gained sufficient political support, even though uniform tax
rules and centralized revenue collection would facilitate level revenue distribution. The
state of Missouri supplements school funding based on funding need but it has not sought
to level funding among districts.65
School district boundaries are not an immutable characteristic of each pupil.
People may move from one school district to another. While economic barriers to
relocation may exist and, accordingly, relocation may be difficult, better-paying
employment could open the door to relocation. The better-funded school district may not
prevent the family from the less funded district from moving across the street to the better-

predominantly black enrollment. Brentwood School District, PUB. SCH. REV., https://www
.publicschoolreview.com/missouri/brentwood-school-district/2905880-school-district
[https://perma.cc/MC6G-DQ7L] (last visited June 26, 2020) (63% white enrollment as of 2020);
Jennings School District, GREAT SCH., https://www.greatschools.org/missouri/saint-louis/jenningsschool-district/ [https://perma.cc/T2DF-BLRF] (last visited June 26, 2020) (98% Black enrollment).
62 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (establishing
authority of courts to order busing to remediate educational segregation).
64 Ryan Delaney, St. Louis school desegregation program begins its long wind down, ST.
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov 1, 2018) https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/st-louis-school-desegregationprogram-begins-its-long-wind-down#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/DK9U-KS9W].
65 See, e.g., 2019 Building Level Expenditure Report, supra note 61.
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funded district, 66 a right that is not available across national borders.67 If, however, too
many lower-income individuals move to the more affluent school district, the existing
residents may choose to limit tax revenue and reject any tax increase, diminishing the
quality of the public schools. Those longer-term, affluent residents who do not relocate
may establish private schools for their children that exclude the new residents through high
costs that often serve as a proxy for prohibited racial discrimination in public education.68
No active discussion is underway in St. Louis County to level tax revenue
distribution countywide to eliminate the disparities in school quality and other
governmental services. Instead of generous cooperation among taxing districts, there is
tax-based competition among governmental units. In St. Louis County, municipal
governments seek to annex unincorporated areas of the county along major thoroughfares
where commercial development and concomitantly sales tax revenue is projected to grow.69
Negotiation between private developers and governmental units for investment in new or
renovated facilities that might bring employment and future tax revenue occurs on the level
of temporary, sometimes long-term, tax concessions. Tax concessions, however,
undermine the ability of state and local governmental units to generate revenue to support
necessary government services when state constitutional tax limitations already make
necessary tax increases troublesome. Concessions to new and existing business interests
require additional taxes on non-affluent residents or a diminution of services.
Governmental units have utilized extra-taxing power, revenue-raising to supplement
limited tax revenue. User fees have substituted for government services historically funded
with general revenue.70 In St Louis County, several municipal governments have resorted
to predatory, revenue-based policing by aggressively enforcing municipal ordinances,
especially traffic rules, to collect fines and court fees from non-affluent violators to
supplement tax revenue.71
While tax concession competition has played an investment role in the U.S. for
many years,72 it has become particularly robust during recent decades. MNEs actively
66 There is a constitutional right to travel and reside without restriction in the U.S. See
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (state cannot impose restriction on personal right to
travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31, 638 (1969) (welfare benefits may not be
conditioned on duration of residency); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338–42 (1972) (durational
residency requirements for voting).
67 Despite their proximity, relocation from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico to El Paso, Texas
requires a U.S. visa to enter and reside unless one is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. See Brassey
& Ordower, supra note 37, at 112-13.
68 See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
69 Boundary Commission of St. Louis County reviews proposal for annexation and
consolidation. See BOUNDARY COMM’N, ST. LOUIS CNTY., MO., https://www.boundarycommission
.com/ [https://perma.cc/WU2W-KTVD] (last visited July 10, 2020).
70 See Kleiman, supra note 56; Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., User Fees Versus Taxes, TAX
ANALYSTS
(Nov.
4,
2011),
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/features.nsf/Articles
/27F622B404B089F68525793E00536946?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/H6V6-MC6N] (last
visited July 10, 2020).
71 Henry Ordower, J.S. Sandoval, & Kenneth Warren, Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors,
Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution and Constitutional Limitations, 61 HOW. L.J. 113 (2017).
72 See Robert S. Chirinko and Daniel J. Wilson, Tax Competition Among U.S. States:
Racing to the Bottom or Riding on a Seesaw? (Fed. Rsrv. Bank S.F., Working Paper 2008-3), https://
www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp08-03bk.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HX5-5ASU]; Henry
Ordower, Les Impôts Relatifs aux Investissements Étrangers aux États-Unis d'Amérique
(Observations Générales), 1996-2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 185-201 (1996)
(includes discussion of negotiated state or local tax concessions).
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solicit bids from governments when they are evaluating where to locate a new or expanded
facility.73 Governmental units offer tax concessions as all or a portion of their proposal to
entice the business decision-makers to invest in the geographic area and bring jobs and
collateral businesses to the governmental unit. Tax concession competition sometimes
even becomes destructive as the commercial development consumes governmental
resources without contributing adequately to tax revenue. Occasionally, the business
attracted with special tax concessions and other subsidies relocates when the period of the
tax concession expires and leaves the governmental unit with facilities that cannot be
adequately utilized. For example, in the case of the Rams, a National Football League
franchise, St. Louis directly and indirectly used tax revenue to provide a stadium. When
the stadium no longer met stadium quality conditions included in the lease, the Rams
became free to abandon the St. Louis area.74 Business demand for tax-based government
contributions has become an important—possibly indispensable—feature of major
developments throughout the U.S. When governmental offers are insufficient, the
businesses go elsewhere. Amazon, for example, negotiated a variety of subsidies,
including tax subsidies from New York City, but when local elected officials began to
object due to the cost to the City, Amazon abandoned its plans to locate a facility in New
York City.75 More egalitarian tax revenue distribution across borders might render tax
concession competition obsolescent as well as unnecessary.
The U.S. has substantial competition across taxing districts and a confusing
profusion of taxing units and tax bases, so that items included in one tax base frequently
become subject to tax under another base as well. Income may be subject to a federal
income tax, a wage income tax (social security), a state income tax, and a local (wagebased) income tax, and the income remaining after the income taxes may become subject
again to a consumption tax when the taxpayer deploys it for purchases and an annual
property tax following purchase. Each tax competes for its share of overall tax revenue.
Part of the competition among jurisdictions may be the absence of one of the taxes. Florida
and Texas, for example, impose no individual state income tax. 76 Alaska, Delaware,
Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon impose no sales tax.77 Tax competition allows
private parties to allocate a portion of what should be tax revenue to themselves. Tax
increment financing, for example, dedicates incremental tax revenue from a private
development to repayment of indebtedness incurred to fund construction of public
73 See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Amazon Chooses 20 Finalists for Second Headquarters, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/technology/amazon-finalistsheadquarters.html [https://perma.cc/Y948-BW5V].
74 See, e.g., Robin Respaut, With NFL Rams Gone, St. Louis Still Stuck with Stadium Debt,
REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sports-nfl-stadiums-insight/with-nflrams-gone-st-louis-still-stuck-with-stadium-debt-idUSKCN0VC0EP
[https://perma.cc/E86HHVV3].
75 See, e.g., Scott Cohn, Amazon reveals the truth on why it nixed New York and chose
Virginia for its HQ2, CNBC (July 10, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/amazon-revealsthe-truth-on-why-it-nixed-ny-and-chose-virginia-for-hq2.html
[https://perma.cc/QMV7-XM9J]
(Amazon withdrew from New York City when city council members balked at size of the tax
concessions); Jacob Passy, This Is What Amazon’s “HQ2” Was Going to Cost New York Taxpayers,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/what-amazons-hq2-meansfor-taxpayers-in-new-york-and-virginia-2018-11-14 [https://perma.cc/ZQM6-FCX9].
76 See also Julie Roin, Changing Places, Changing Taxes: Exploiting Tax Discontinuities,
Symposium on Legal Discontinuities 28 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 740),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3587056 [https://perma.cc/TNS8-QVMS].
77 What States Impose Sales/Use Tax? SALES TAX INST., https://www.salestaxinstitute.com
/sales_tax_faqs/what_states_impose_sales_use_tax [https://perma.cc/2JVE-BWHT].
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improvements necessary to service the private development. Absent the tax increment
financing, the private developer would be responsible for the cost of the public
improvements because those improvements are required to accommodate the
development. 78 Similarly, the charitable contribution deduction 79 enables taxpayers to
allocate a portion of a taxing unit’s revenue to other private interests rather than leaving
the revenue distribution to the government officials charged with distributing the public
purse. In the case of charitable contributions, the private interests are charities of the
donor’s choice, rather than governmentally selected functions.80
Tax concessions often mean that those best able to pay taxes are not required to
pay. Tax concessions do not necessarily reduce tax revenues for the taxing unit granting
the concessions. If the new business activity did not exist in the taxing unit previously, it
was not generating tax revenue. Nevertheless, business development frequently increases
demand for governmental services and concomitantly the need for tax revenue to pay for
the services. Funding the services may require property owners, other than those receiving
concessions, to pay increased property taxes if the business draws additional residents and
concomitant demand for public schools. Alternatively, an increased population increases
sales tax revenue as greater revenue demands may be met with additional sales and use
taxes to carry the increased tax burden at the expense of those with moderate income. In
locales like Missouri subject to statutory or constitutional tax limitations requiring voter
approval for tax increases, if California and Missouri are representative, voters approve
rate increases for sales taxes more frequently than property taxes, even though property
taxes tend to be less regressive relative to income or wealth than sales taxes.81 Moreover,
increased consumption tax revenue may not flow from the increased business activity, as
the dedication of consumption tax revenue from the new business activity to the business’
facilities or debt servicing may be among the concessions. 82 Facilities for product
distribution produce relatively little incremental consumption tax revenue locally as the
consumption taxes are collected and paid to the taxing authority where the purchaser
receives and uses the product, if at all.83 Jurisdictions that collect income or payroll taxes
78 Tax Increment Financing: The Basics, NAT’L HOUS. CONF., https://nhc.org/policyguide/tax-increment-financing-the-basics/ [https://perma.cc/BAQ8-H3XJ].
79 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
80 See Henry Ordower, Charitable Contributions of Services: Charitable Gift Planning for
Non-Itemizers, 67 TAX L. 517, 533-36 (2014).
81 See MAC TAYLOR, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., A LOOK AT VOTER-APPROVAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCAL TAXES 11 (2014), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/finance/localtaxes/voter-approval-032014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FAE-YQBP] (greater approval rate for taxes
like sales taxes that do not require a super majority in California). See also Taxes on the Ballot,
https://ballotpedia.org/Taxes_on_the_ballot
[https://perma.cc/HT87-MNW8]
BALLOTPEDIA,
(Missouri tax provision ballots on general and property tax increases).
82 This is a common concession for servicing indebtedness on professional entertainment
facilities, including stadiums, as well as warehouses and distribution centers like Amazon.
Arlington’s Record Sales-Tax Revenue Will Pay Off Cowboys Stadium Debt Years Early, DALL.
MORNING NEWS (Nov. 21, 2012), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2012/11/22/arlington-s-recordsales-tax-revenue-will-pay-off-cowboys-stadium-debt-years-early/ [https://perma.cc/5YA9-4EMU]
(record sales tax revenue rise allows city leaders to pay off the stadium debt early). See also Alicia
Robinson, Stadium Maintenance, Debt Eat into Anaheim’s Revenue from Hosting Angels Baseball,
ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/09/25/stadiummaintenance-debt-eat-into-anaheims-revenue-from-hosting-angels-baseball/
[https://perma.cc/2NGP-FP2X].
83 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (expanding the authority of states
to require vendors with no physical presence in the state to collect and pay over the sales or use tax
on items sold to state residents). Sales taxes are add-on taxes imposed when personal property is
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may derive additional revenue from the workers at the new facility, but in many instances
those workers are not new but have changed employment. Where the workers are new
taxpayers in the jurisdiction, they seem likely to be predominantly moderate to low-income
workers because the facilities may require warehouse, maintenance and concession labor
in greater numbers than highly compensated management employees.84 Taxes applicable
to them are often flat or regressive rather than progressive.85 In addition, part of the federal
income tax is imposed separately on wages and self-employment income and is regressive
because of its wage cap and its limitation to income from services.86
The growing disparity in wealth between affluent and non-affluent residents of the
U.S. has been attributed in part to taxation. 87 Proposals to introduce or expand
progressivity in taxation to impose a greater tax burden on affluent taxpayers or to impose
a tax on wealth have found proponents among members of Congress who would deploy
the revenue to improve services and living conditions for the less affluent members of the
society.88 Those senators have not garnered adequate political support for their positions
to enact the changes. Recent analysis by a group of economists addressing recovery from
the economic impact of the 2020 pandemic instills new force into the wealth tax and
withdrawal or freezing of tax benefits for successful businesses. 89 Even if enacted,
purchased for consumption rather than resale. The vendor generally collects the tax and pays it over
to the state. If the vendor sells to a purchaser in another state, the purchaser becomes liable to the
other state for complementary use tax. Collection of use tax is difficult unless the vendor collects
and pays over the tax. Until the Wayfair decision, states could not require a vendor to collect use tax
on sales into the state unless the vendor had a direct or indirect presence there. The Wayfair decision
removed the physical presence requirement for vendors with substantial sales into a state so that a
state may require out of state vendors to collect their use tax and pay it over less a fee for their
collection services. The state of Missouri has not yet enacted legislation implementing the Wayfair
decision for sales into Missouri. See Hannah Meehan, Sales Tax for Remote Sellers: Missouri’s
Response in A Post-Wayfair World, ST. LOUIS U. L.J. ONLINE 23, https://scholarship.law.slu.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=lawjournalonline [https://perma.cc/9MC5-UW9M].
84 Stadiums may be an exception if they are built to house a professional sports business
employing many highly compensated athletes.
85 Like earnings taxes in a number of cities, St. Louis City Earnings Tax is imposed on
income from services only at a flat rate of 1 percent and is regressive because it does not tax
investment income. See ST. LOUIS, MO., MUN. CODE Ch. 5.22, https://library.municode.com
/mo/st._louis/codes/code_of_ordinances/364861?nodeId=RECOSALO2020AN_TIT5REFI_CH5.2
2EATA [https://perma.cc/J33R-39TT].
86 See, for example, social security tax in the U.S. that is imposed at a flat rate on wages
(not income from investment or business ownership) up to a ceiling amount of $137,700 in 2020 and
then zero for wages in excess of that ceiling. See Social Security and Medicare Withholding Taxes,
IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751 [https://perma.cc/WD4R-YDX2].
87 See E
MMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE RICH
DODGE TAXES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY (2019); Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The
Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States 6 (Mar. 2, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF6MRT3Z]; The Distribution of Household Income, 2016, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov
/publication/55413 [https://perma.cc/J2Z5-EKQF] (July 9, 2019); Henry Ordower, Taxes and
Inequality, in INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE RICH POOR DIVIDE
(Kimberley L. Kinsley & Robert S. Rycroft eds.) (forthcoming 2021).
88 Neil Irwin, Elizabeth Warren Wants a Wealth Tax. How Would That Even Work?, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/upshot/warren-wealth-tax.html
[https://perma.cc/835F-6QH2]; Huaqun Li & Karl Smith, Analysis of Sen. Warren and Sen. Sanders’
Wealth Tax Plans, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/wealth-tax/
[https://perma.cc/835F-6QH2].
89 INDEP. COMM’N FOR REFORM INT ’L CORP. TAX’N, THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC, SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY, AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com
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however, no one is proposing distribution of increased tax revenue beyond the borders of
the relevant taxing unit—whether that unit is a specialized, municipal, state, or national
unit. A school taxing district in St. Louis County is not sharing revenue with another school
taxing district, nor a state like Missouri sharing revenue with a neighboring state like
Arkansas, nor the U.S. sharing revenue with Mexico. Residents of one U.S. jurisdiction
may move freely to another U.S. jurisdiction with a better tax base and better governmental
services, for example, between lesser and better funded St. Louis County school districts
or across state lines if they have the wherewithal to change their residence. On the other
hand, if the better-funded school district is in El Paso, Texas, and the lesser funded district
in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, moving to the better-funded district is problematic even if the
distance from one to the other is small. The existence of national borders as a barrier to
opportunity renders the argument for cross-border revenue distribution even more
compelling than cross-district where the individual may choose to relocate and capture
access to the better funded district. Even within the U.S., however, ability to relocate is
circumscribed by individual economic factors including employment and accumulated
wealth.90
The concept of sovereignty supports respecting a taxing unit’s choice to spend the
tax revenue it manages to collect, even where the tax base is produced by activities in other
places. A product manufactured in Illinois but sold to Missouri consumers is subject to
Missouri consumption tax, as a product manufactured in Mexico but transported to and
then sold to U.S. consumers is subject to consumption taxes in the U.S., not Mexico. Illinois
or Mexico in the examples derive no benefit from the consumption tax on sale. Illinois and
Mexico might encourage their local vendors to assist purchasers in Missouri or the U.S.,
respectively, to avoid Missouri or other U.S. consumption taxes by shipping items directly
to consumers in the other jurisdiction free from the consumption tax.91 Any benefit Illinois
or Mexico derives from increased business activity locally, even if minimal, is nevertheless
more than it would have received from the consumption tax imposed by a neighboring
jurisdiction. Sovereignty is a political shield that fails to take unequal distribution of wealth
and resources into account.
Despite central collection and administration in St. Louis County or, with respect
to consumption taxes, the state of Missouri, sharing revenue across taxing unit borders
remains bewilderingly difficult no matter how geographically close or closely connected
the communities may be, how similar the residents are to one another, and how unequal
the revenue distribution may be. Leveling revenue distribution to provide comparable
services and opportunities throughout St. Louis County seems a desirable fairness
objective. Even within St. Louis County’s narrow governmental overlay of central
collection and administration under uniform taxing rules and with a uniform tax base,
taking this next step toward fairer distribution of tax revenue remains elusive.
For businesses within St. Louis County where taxing rules, structures and
measurement of the tax object are uniform, differentials in local property tax rates remain
a factor in evaluating where to locate or expand a business facility. Active tax competition
and disparities in tax revenue among taxing jurisdictions in St. Louis County help to make
some business locations more desirable than others. Taxing jurisdictions within St. Louis
/static/5a0c602bf43b5594845abb81/t/5ee79779c63e0b7d057437f8/1592235907012/ICRICT+Glob
al+pandemic+and+international+taxation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV82-LRSE].
90 Cf. supra note 66 and accompanying text (constitutional rights to travel and reside within
the national borders but not across).
91 Subject to possible use tax collection obligations. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
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County have not unified to distribute revenue to promote development for the entire region,
but that step would be administratively feasible because the infrastructure for it is already
in place. Only rates of tax and the distribution formula would require revision to make
fairer shares of resources available to all districts.
If distribution of tax revenue to achieve greater uniformity in governmental
services is a desirable goal, as this Article argues it is, uniform tax rules, uniform tax rates,
and a distribution formula meeting community needs is critical to achieve that goal.
Disparities in revenue distribution in St. Louis County are easy to level with the
fundamental tax base uniformity already in place, even though leveling is not occurring or
even under discussion. Globally, the OECD is promoting increased uniformity, not to level
tax resource distribution, but to combat tax competition that diminishes tax revenue for
developed economies. While frequently couched in terms of MNEs and other taxpayers
ceasing to engage in tax avoidance and paying their “fair share” of tax, a primarily political
objective,92 generating increased tax revenue to ameliorate relative poverty locally has not
been matched with worldwide tax revenue distribution to eliminate absolute poverty
internationally.93
If assistance and cooperation from less developed economies in combating tax
competition and tax avoidance is necessary to advance the developed economies’ efforts,
fairer worldwide tax revenue distribution is critical, and less developed economies must be
given a reason not to use their tax systems to compete. Globally, distribution is of first
importance but uniformity remains a close second in significance because without
uniformity, as is present in the St. Louis County administered property value tax base, it is
difficult to compare tax levies to ascertain whether one country is collecting an appropriate
tax on its share of the worldwide tax base. The tax base in international projects is income,
but not all tax systems measure income in an identical manner. The next section considers
whether international projects facilitate any movement toward uniform rules to facilitate
fairer tax revenue distribution. No international project has selected tax revenue
distribution, as opposed to tax base distribution, as its objective except as an incidental
effect of tax base allocation.
IV.
INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND REALLOCATING THE TAX
BASE
A.
BEPS and Other Projects
In response to aggressive tax planning and “harmful” tax competition,94 various
proposals have been crafted to prevent base erosion and profit shifting. These proposals
are particularly salient in light of the increasing digitalization of the economy and a surge
in intangible digital assets. As the current leader in international tax, the OECD has
spearheaded most projects, such as the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) action
92
See Brassey & Ordower, supra note 37, at 99 (“[P]urported moral authority to address
inequality within national borders is really a political demand to further the economic interests of
particular groups that are already among the most economically privileged when viewed on an
international spectrum.”).
93 See Id. (finding that political will to confront international poverty is lacking); infra Part
IV.
94 Speculative costs of revenue loss show that profit shifting has a more harmful effect on
developing countries, with the implied long run revenue loss for advanced economies totaling 0.6%
of the GDP and close to 2% of the GDP for developing countries. Ernesto Crivelli, et al., Base
Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries 20 (IMF, Working Paper No. 15/118, 2015),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15118.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK4F-A5UZ].
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reports and the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) proposal. In parallel with the OECD
projects, the EU also has relaunched the CCCTB 95 to harmonize the taxing rules and
standards of member states and to better incorporate the BEPS actions through cohesive
legislation. The CCCTB more simply tries to apportion the corporate income tax base
consistently and predictably among the EU jurisdictions in which the company operates so
that each may tax its share of an MNE’s income under its own income tax rules but with
no part of the income subject to tax in more than one jurisdiction or not subject to tax in
any jurisdiction. 96 While the CCCTB project does not seek complete uniformity in
computational rules for tax purposes beyond what is necessary to facilitate apportionment,
its adoption should result in considerable convergence of tax rules to create a consistent
base to apportion.
Requested and endorsed by the G2097 leaders, the OECD aggregated 15 Actions
intended to combat the abuse of profit shifting as exacerbated by the digital economy. The
Actions confront the unique challenges of the digital economy;98 aim to neutralize hybrid
mismatch arrangements; 99 strengthen CFC rules; 100 reduce base erosion via interest
deductions and other financial payments;101 recognize and counter harmful tax practices;102
prevent treaty abuse; 103 prevent the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment; 104
ensure transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation;105 collect and analyze data
on BEPS;106 require the disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements;107 re-examine
95

Q&A CCCTB, supra note 18.
Income not subject to taxation in any jurisdiction is known as “stateless income.” See
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 702-07 (2011).
97 The Group of 20 is organization of finance ministers and central bank governors, and
member countries account for 80% of the world’s GDP. G20 aims to unite world leaders on
economic, political, and health challenges. See Michael Crowley, What Is the G20?, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/world/asia/what-is-the-g20.html [https://
perma.cc/WVN8-FBUR].
98 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter ACTION
1].
99 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, NEUTRALISING THE
EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, ACTION 2 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015). Cf. I.R.C. §
267A (denying deductions or exclusions for related party and hybrid transactions resulting in a
mismatch of inclusion and exclusion or deduction).
100 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, DESIGNING
EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES, ACTION 3 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
101 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, LIMITING BASE
EROSION INVOLVING INTEREST DEDUCTIONS AND OTHER FINANCIAL PAYMENTS, ACTION 4 - 2015
FINAL REPORT (2015).
102 OECD/G20 B
ASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, COUNTERING
HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND
SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
103 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, PREVENTING THE
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6 - 2015 FINAL REPORT
(2015).
104 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, PREVENTING THE
ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT STATUS, ACTION 7 - 2015 FINAL REPORT
(2015).
105 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER
PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, ACTION 8-10 - 2015 FINAL REPORTS (2015).
106 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, MEASURING AND
MONITORING BEPS, ACTION 11 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
107 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE RULES, ACTION 12 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
96

2021]

UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL TAX COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION

127

transfer pricing; 108 improve dispute resolution mechanisms; 109 and create a multilateral
instrument for synchronized modification of bilateral tax treaties that incorporates the
OECD Actions without renegotiating existing bilateral treaties.110 Only four of the actions,
however, were agreed upon as part of the minimum standards discussed in the BEPS
Inclusive Framework and committed to by the member countries.111
Despite such ambitious and all-encompassing objectives, the action plans have
fallen short of some critics’ expectations.112 A repeated criticism of the BEPS project is
that it does not address the underlying faults of the existing international tax system and
instead rehashes and strengthens existing rules and principles.113 Some commentators state
that the foundational tax base allocation rules that pre-exist and are enforced by BEPS
ensure that higher income countries are consistently assigned a greater share of revenue
than lower income countries.114 The OECD has recognized and committed itself to being

108 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, TRANSFER PRICING
DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING, ACTION 13 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015)
[hereinafter ACTION 13].
109 OECD/G20 B
ASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, MAKING DISPUTE
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, ACTION 14 – 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
110 OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD, DEVELOPING A
MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, ACTION 15 – 2015 FINAL REPORT
(2015) [hereinafter ACTION 15].
111 The minimum standards which have been committed to are: fighting harmful tax
practices (Action 5), preventing tax treaty abuse (Action 6), improving transparency with Countryby-Country reporting (Action 13), and enhancing the effectiveness of mechanisms for dispute
resolution (Action 14). OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS REPORT JULY 2016JUNE 2017 9-12 (2017). To date, 139 countries are members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework
on BEPS. Members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-composition.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/UX73-8CHR] (last updated Feb. 2021) [hereinafter BEPS Members].
112 See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Defining a Country’s “Fair Share” of Taxes, 42 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 373 (2015). For conceptual background on developing international fair taxation standards,
see Steven A. Dean, Neither Rules nor Standards, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 538 (2011); Nancy H.
Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 145 (1998).
113 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the
Benefits Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight, 60 HARV. BUS. L. REV.186, 208 (2016). See also
Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2017)
(project’s lack of coordinated rules results in vague standards that everyone accords different
meanings within each country. Further, the OECD missed the opportunity to truly examine the
underlying causes of the issues and meaningfully discuss the reasons for tax competition and the
tension between emerging economies and OECD members); Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Are
We Heading Towards a Corporate System Fit for the 21st Century?, 35 FISCAL STUD. 449 (2014) (it
is not a fundamental reform because the OECD does not set out to change the framework or even
question the desirability or logic of the existing regime); Jakib A. Bartoszewski & Andew P. Morriss,
An Archipelago of Contrasts: Blacklists, Caribbean Autonomy and the New Tax Colonialism, IFC
(June 17, 2020), https://www.ifcreview.com/articles/2020/june/an-archipelago-of-contrastsblacklists-caribbean-autonomy-and-the-new-tax-colonialism
[https://perma.cc/BTL6-3EE3]
(arguing that the blacklisting of Caribbean tax havens by the EU is a new form of colonialism and
the EU should instead focus on designing its own efficient tax regime to protect its tax revenue);
Steven A. Dean, FATCA, the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus, and the OECD Blacklist, 99 TAX
NOTES INT'L 83 (July 6, 2020) (discussing the role of the Congressional Black Caucus in the U.S.
withdrawal from the OECD project on harmful tax competition because of its adverse effect on low
wealth, predominantly black jurisdictions).
114 Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 32, at 2.
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more inclusive of developing countries, 115 although some believe that the only way to
achieve this is by overhauling the foundational principles of the existing system, which
inherently favors higher income countries, and which BEPS fails to do.116 Others believe
that the Actions may allow for greater source-country taxation, which could be beneficial
for developing countries that generally are considered source countries, provided that the
necessary multinational consensus on the allocation of taxing rights is forthcoming.117
Action 13 re-examines transfer pricing documentation and requires country-bycountry reporting. The Action includes the requirement that MNEs provide relevant
governments with the information necessary to correct and fair allocation of income among
states,118 while Action 15 contemplates developing a multilateral instrument to synchronize
modification of existing bilateral treaties without the need to renegotiate those treaties.119
Some consider the country-by-country reporting recommendation innovative and
collaborative, as it enhances transparency and allows informed discussion. 120 The
multilateral instrument proposal has been described as almost revolutionary given the
current predominantly bilateral tax treaty regimes, and some have argued that success of
this proposal would be sufficient to qualify the BEPS project as a success, regardless of the
success or failure of the other actions.121
B.
GloBE – Minimum Tax and Base Erosion
Following concern and criticism that the BEPS final Actions do not go far enough
in addressing the issues of profit shifting, the OECD responded with the GloBE proposal.
Pillar one of GloBE concerns the allocation of tax rights among jurisdictions, and Pillar
Two imposes two new taxes: a global minimum tax on corporate profits and a tax on base
eroding payments.122 Encompassed within the global minimum tax is an income inclusion
rule, implementing a supplementary tax on the income of foreign entities where the income
otherwise would be subject to a tax below the effective minimum rate. The minimum tax
also would allow residence jurisdictions to switch from an exemption to a credit method
when profits attributable to a permanent establishment are subject to an effective rate below
the minimum rate.123 Functionally, the minimum tax would resemble the existing U.S.
worldwide taxation system under which U.S. persons are taxable on their worldwide
115 OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: SECRETARIAT PROPOSAL FOR A “UNIFIED
APPROACH” UNDER PILLAR ONE 6 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultationdocument-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach-pillar-one.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DKW-6ELY].
116 See Herzfeld, supra note 113.
117 David Spencer, BEPS and Allocation of Taxing Rights, 29 J. INT’L TAX’N 143, 155
(2018).
118 See A
CTION 13, supra note 108, at 23.
119 See ACTION 15, supra note 110.
120 Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS? 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 104-05 (2014). But see Devereux
& Vella, supra note 113, at 461-62 (noting that the information is only to be disclosed to tax
authorities and not the public, therefore reducing its transparency).
121 Brauner, supra note 120, at 107. See also Rasmus Corlin Christensen & Martin Hearson,
The New Politics of Global Tax Governance: Taking Stock a Decade After the Financial Crisis, 26
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1068, 1077 (2019) (noting that the multilateral instrument is the result of
deeper and broader sovereignty-constraining effects than ever before).
122 See OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS, OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO
DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF
THE ECONOMY (2019) [hereinafter OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS].
123 OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION PROPOSAL
(GLOBE) (PILLAR TWO): TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY 6
(2019) [hereinafter GLOBE PILLAR TWO PUBLIC CONSULTATION].
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income in the U.S.124 but the U.S. tax is reduced through a tax credit by the tax properly
payable to the source jurisdiction.125
The GloBE tax on base eroding payments includes an undertaxed payments rule.
That rule denies a deduction or imposes a tax at the payment’s source if the payment is to
a party related to the payer and the payment is not subject to the specified minimum tax
rate where it is received. This aspect of the GloBE tax proposal operates similarly to the
base erosion anti-avoidance minimum tax the U.S. enacted in 2017.126 In addition, the
GloBE tax more generally denies treaty benefits such as a reduced withholding rate if a
payment does not result in income that is subject to tax at the specified minimum tax rate.127
The GloBE project suggests a means to remove tax from the international mix of
business development incentives. Although GloBE focuses on the digital economy, its
principles apply to a broader range of problems as well. GloBE’s two fundamental
principles resemble approaches the U.S. and other jurisdictions already have taken with
respect to their own resident MNEs. One principle includes the income of foreign branches
and controlled entities in the income of the parent or principal entity based in the higher
tax jurisdiction if the branch or controlled entity is resident in a low tax jurisdiction.128
Unlike most countries that have territorial income tax systems under which branch income
is only taxable where earned, the U.S. already includes the income of foreign branches
under the rubric of worldwide taxation of its citizens, residents and domestic entities.
Unless the U.S. taxpayers interpose a foreign corporation, 129 they are taxable on foreign
source income immediately and capture no benefit from operating or investing directly in
a low tax jurisdiction.130
The GloBE proposal as applied to controlled entities resembles existing CFC131
regimes common to the U.S. and other jurisdictions.132 In the U.S., Subpart F income133 of
a CFC is taxable to its U.S. shareholders.134 Like the GloBE minimum tax treatment of
124

See I.R.C. § 61; Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b).
See I.R.C. § 901(b)(1).
126 See I.R.C. § 59A.
127 GLOBE PILLAR TWO PUBLIC CONSULTATION, supra note 123, at 34.
128 See id. at 29-30.; DEVEREUX ET AL., supra note 16, at 1-2; Ruth Mason, The
Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT'L L. 353, 376 (2020).
129 The U.S. may not tax a foreign corporation on its income from non-U.S. sources and
not effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business directly. I.R.C. §§ 11(d), 882
(tax on foreign corporations). The controlled foreign corporation anti-avoidance rules discussed infra
note 132 and accompanying text may tax all or part of the foreign corporation’s income to its U.S.
shareholders.
130 New but limited territoriality in U.S. tax law under section 245A, added by the TCJA ,
now provides a 100 percent dividends received deduction for distributions from foreign corporations
to U.S. corporate shareholders owning at least 10 percent of the foreign corporation enables U.S.
corporations to operate outside the U.S. through non-U.S. subsidiaries and, subject to CFC and base
erosion minimum tax limitations, avoid the U.S. income tax.
131
A CFC is a foreign corporation in which United States shareholders (U.S. shareholders)
own more than 50 percent of the voting shares and share value. I.R.C. § 957(a). Section 951(b)
defines a U.S. shareholder as a U.S. person owning, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the
voting shares or the share value of the foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 951(b).
132 See Sebastian Dueñas, CFC Rules Around the World,, TAX FOUND. (June 2019),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20190617100144/CFC-Rules-Around-the-World-FF-659.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZX9A-3V26] (describing CFC rules outside the U.S.).
133 I.R.C. § 952.
134 Section 951(a) includes the U.S. shareholder’s pro rata share of the CFC’s Subpart F
income, as defined in section 952, in the shareholder’s U.S. income subject to tax currently without
distribution from the CFC. I.R.C. §§ 951(a), 952.
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rates at least equal to the minimum tax rate, 135 if the foreign base company income 136
portion of the subpart F income is taxed in the CFC residence country at a rate greater than
90 percent of the U.S. corporate tax rate, that portion of the subpart F income is not subject
to CFC inclusion in the U.S. shareholders’ incomes.137 Foreign base company income
includes income from sales and services attributable to the CFC if there is little or no
business reason, other than tax, for sourcing the income in that corporation.138 U.S. noncorporate shareholders of CFCs also must include their pro rata shares of the CFC’s global
intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) annually, 139 but corporate shareholders of CFCs
include only half their shares of the GILTI income because they may deduct half the GILTI
income under the foreign derived intangible income provision.140 GILTI includes income
produced by intangible assets, including income from the digital economy, which is
GloBE's focus, in U.S. shareholders’ portions of includable CFC income.141 For instance,
intellectual property produces digital economy income that is predominantly intangible and
which becomes part of net tested CFC income142 but generates no offsetting net deemed
tangible income return 143 because intangible intellectual property is excluded from
qualified business asset investment.144
The second pillar of the GloBE proposals, the “base erosion” proposal, disallows
deductions and treaty benefits for base erosion payments. A base erosion payment but for
the GloBE proposal rule would yield a deduction or enjoy a treaty benefit without the
payment becoming subject to tax in the recipient’s jurisdiction at or above a designated
minimum rate. Tax rate arbitrage with related party payments is commonplace where no
anti-avoidance rule or minimum tax discourages it. Where the parties to the transaction
have a community of economic interests as related parties do or have some other
opportunity to return part of the low tax jurisdiction’s profit to other party free from a tax
in the higher tax jurisdiction, the parties may share the tax savings from the structure
without any non-tax economic cost to either party.145 The base erosion proposal addresses
this longstanding problem of tax rate arbitrage. Where the payments are between related
parties, transfer pricing limitations have long enabled the tax administrator to attribute the
income to a different taxpayer than the taxpayer receiving it.146 The base erosion proposal
supplements the inquiry into whether the payment to a related party is an arms’ length
transfer price by limiting the tax arbitrage opportunity for all related party payments. The
U.S. recently sought to accomplish a similar tax arbitrage limiting function with its separate
base erosion minimum tax, known as BEAT, for certain related party payments.147
The minimum tax and the denial of the deduction or treaty benefit would compel
the low tax jurisdiction to enact a rate at least equal to the minimum rate. Failing to collect
135

GLOBE PILLAR TWO PUBLIC CONSULTATION, supra note 123.
I.R.C. § 954.
137 I.R.C. § 954(b)(4).
138 I.R.C. § 954(d).
139
See I.R.C. § 951A (added by the TCJA).
140 I.R.C. § 250 (added by the TCJA).
141 I.R.C. § 951(a).
142 I.R.C. § 951A(c).
143 I.R.C. § 951A(b)(2).
144 I.R.C. § 951A(d).
145 Cf. I.R.C. § 7701(o) (requiring economic substance independent of tax benefits for an
arrangement to yield the tax outcomes that the parties have structured into the transaction).
146 I.R.C. § 482 and related regulations.
147 I.R.C. § 59A (added by the TCJA, imposing a minimum tax at 10 percent, increasing to
12.5 percent in 2025).
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the minimum tax amount would relinquish the potential tax revenue without having a
benefit to offer to the investor because the high tax jurisdiction will capture the difference
between the low tax jurisdiction’s actual tax and the minimum tax or all the revenue in the
case of the base erosion payment.148 Although the BEPS projects, when fully implemented,
may represent a principle of full taxation,149 the policy consensus of the BEPS project has
been that no or low taxation is not itself a cause of concern. 150 BEPS’ objectives are: (1)
to prevent profit shifting by supplementing traditional transfer pricing controls with a
minimum tax, and (2) to reduce tax competition by segregating transactions with related
parties even if at an arms’ length price whenever they do not incur a tax equal to or greater
than the minimum tax. The latter objective may be more difficult to achieve insofar as it
burdens a discrete class of taxable income from transactions between related persons that
is taxed less favorably than other income even though it may flow from arms’ length
transactions that transfer pricing law would accept as correctly characterized and would
not reallocate between or among taxpayers. Critics consider the application of the
deduction denial and loss of treaty benefit to even arms’ length payments between related
parties as adversely affecting countries’ ability to attract investment and activity that does
not abuse tax rules because a country chooses to attract investment with low or zero tax
rates. The deduction denial and loss of the treaty benefit rule prevents countries from
taxing profits generated through actual activity taking place within their borders at any rate
they choose. That tax rate limitation diminishes the sovereignty of low and zero tax
countries. 151 Other commentators appreciate that the minimum tax could significantly
reduce the distortions of international capital allocation and remove incentives to shift
profits, although it does not fully equalize the tax burden of domestic and foreign
investment.152 Similarly, commentators express the view that a minimum tax infringes on
sovereignty is a questionable premise, as unfettered sovereignty can only be claimed in
purely internal situations. In the international context, external interests may require
compromise of sovereignty to maintain peaceful relations and cross-border commerce.153
The GloBE proposal does acknowledge that there is international capital
imbalance disfavoring less developed economies. The OECD views the GloBE proposal
as a way to remedy that imbalance. The proposal would allocate a somewhat greater share
of the base to less developed jurisdictions. Under the guise of tax fairness, the minimum
tax will inhibit jurisdictions from engaging in tax-based competition for inbound
investment with tax concessions for international investors. Less developed jurisdictions
will collect more tax on their larger shares of the tax base than they might have collected
with robust tax competition because they will impose a tax at a rate no less than the
minimum tax.
Like the other OECD projects, the GloBE project is mindful of tax sovereignty
but, nevertheless, intrudes upon taxing sovereignty with effective economic compulsion to
enact a minimum rate of tax through the VAT directive that limits the tax sovereignty of
the EU member states. 154 GloBE provides a trade-off for the relinquishment of tax
148

See DEVEREUX ET AL., supra note 16, at 1-2; discussion infra Part V.
Mason, supra note 128, at 370 (“BEPS both confirmed and operationalized full taxation
as a new international tax norm.”).
150 DEVEREUX ET AL., supra note 16, at 1.
151 Id. at 5.
152 Joachim Englisch & Johannes Becker, International Effective Minimum Taxation – The
GLOBE Proposal, 11 WORLD TAX J. 483 (2019).
153 Id. at 492-93.
154 EC Council Directive, supra note 44 (VAT directive in the EU).
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sovereignty by restructuring the allocation of the income tax base such that more allocation
is accorded to less developed countries. Except for the minimum rate, the project does not
promote broad taxing uniformity. Neither does the project recommend uniform rules of
taxation across jurisdictions. It leaves the administration and collection of tax on the
jurisdiction’s share of the tax base to each taxing jurisdiction. Accordingly, a jurisdiction
interested in offering a tax-based subsidy might adjust its tax rules to benefit the subsidized
taxpayer while maintaining a nominal tax rate equal to the minimum. The complexity of
addressing all possible tax subsidization permutations will be challenging to police.
Despite the BEPS’ objective to prevent erosion of the base with international coordination,
developed and dominant economies exercising tax sovereignty, even consistent with
BEPS, have flexibility in designing their own domestic tax rules in a manner that might
impose some of their rules indirectly on other economies. By applying its own taxing rules
in determining whether or not an MNE was subject to tax at a rate equal to or greater than
the minimum tax rate, a developed and dominant economy might compel other economies
to coordinate their tax rules. Results would differ depending on the rules in the taxpayer’s
home jurisdiction as opposed to another major economy’s rules. Where the MNE is
operating in multiple jurisdictions and each or many jurisdictions apply their own taxing
rules to determine whether the MNE is paying the minimum tax amount, a cacophony of
outcomes might result offering little improvement over what exists now.
Ultimately, it seems that the success of the GloBE proposal depends on the nearunanimous adoption of the minimum tax and the tax on base eroding payments. Otherwise,
the proposal might exacerbate tax competition problems, as non-adopting countries that
refrain from implementing the measures could manipulate this to their tax advantage. They
might entice MNEs to move their parent company to their jurisdiction by offering a tax
home free from the minimum tax requirement. Countries adopting the minimum tax and
base eroding tax must design methods to prevent migration of MNEs as the U.S. sought to
do with its anti-inversion legislation. 155 Similarly, harmonization of the tax base and
applicable thresholds is essential to the success of the project lest countries simply continue
to compete by adjusting rules of inclusion and thresholds.
C.
Tax Competition, Avoidance, and Evasion
While the OECD pushes on with its project to overhaul taxation of MNEs and has
140 countries scheduled to participate in meetings on a revised international tax
framework,156 the framework is unlikely to eliminate international tax competition. Even
among the 140 participants, a variety of competing concerns may manifest themselves
among the participants. The U.S., for example, continues to express reservations with

155

I.R.C. § 7874.
Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Postpones Key Meeting of Global Tax Overhaul
Project, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L (May 5, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-news/oecdpostpones-key-meeting-global-tax-overhaul-project/2020/05/04/2ch38
[https://perma.cc/76WNAFWC].
156

2021]

UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL TAX COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION

127

respect to digital services,157 and 53 U.N. member states158 are not even included in the
OECD deliberations. Moreover, while the base erosion projects address a variety of
methods that taxpayers use to shift income source to low tax jurisdictions, they do not unify
all computational rules and tax rates.
The OECD also publicly identified tax havens that engaged in harmful tax
competition to shame or coerce them to cooperate with the major market jurisdictions and
share information. Information sharing would assist the developed economy countries to
identify investors subject to their general taxing jurisdiction when those investors conceal
assets in low tax jurisdictions to avoid home country taxes.159 The harmful tax competition
project has encouraged rapid growth of agreements on information sharing.160 The U.S.
also coerced international cooperation by enacting legislation denying favorable U.S. tax
status to foreign entities that did not provide information on their U.S. direct and indirect
investors who were investing outside the U.S. and not reporting their income from those
investments.161 Perhaps the most interesting action regarding information gathering was
when Germany purchased a stolen list of German investors in Liechtenstein Stiftungen to
discover those investors’ evasion of German tax liability.162
The U.S. approach to tax competition differs somewhat from that of other OECD
countries. Since the U.S. taxes its citizens, residents, and domestic entities on their income
from all sources worldwide, 163 operating or investing directly in low tax jurisdictions
provides U.S. persons no tax benefit provided that the U.S. taxpayer reports completely
and honestly. Hiding assets and failing to report offshore income is tax fraud which may
subject the taxpayer to civil and criminal penalties.164 The tax on worldwide income in the
U.S. similarly eliminates the benefit of negotiated tax concessions insofar as the U.S.
applies a credit rather than exemption165 to all foreign source income and generally cedes
primary taxing authority to the source country through the foreign tax credit 166 but

157 See id.; William Hoke, U.S. Says OECD Talks on Digital Economy Have Hit an
Impasse, TAX NOTES (June 22, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/digital-economy
/us-says-oecd-talks-digital-economy-have-hit-impasse/2020/06/22/2cmvw [https://perma.cc/8ZNZX3CF]; Stephanie Soong Johnston, Business Groups Rally Around OECD Global Tax Deal Work,
TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L (June 29, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international
/digital-economy/business-groups-rally-around-oecd-global-tax-deal-work/2020/06/29/2cnr7
[https://perma.cc/Z657-3LQD]; Stephanie Soong Johnston, Global Tax Revamp Talks ’Not on Life
Support,’ Saint-Amans Says, 98 TAX NOTES INT’L 1536 (June 29, 2020),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/politics-taxation/global-tax-revamp-talks-notlife-support-saint-amans-says/2020/06/29/2cnj3 [https://perma.cc/Z4Y3-HPTP].
158 The U.N. has 193 member states, and 140 member states participate, leaving 53 nonparticipants. See About the UN, UN, https://www.un.org/en/about-un/index.html [https://perma.cc
/Q56A-TSKD] (193 U.N. member states); Johnston, supra note 156 (about 140 U.N. member states
participate in OECD deliberations).
159 See OECD HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 12, at 24, 50.
160 TIEA, supra note 9 (showing increasing numbers of agreements from 2001 to 2012).
161 See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).
162 Ordower, supra note 42, at 124.
163 I.R.C. § 61 (gross income includes all income from whatever source derived); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (worldwide income taxed).
164 I.R.C. § 7201.
165 Cf. GLOBE PILLAR TWO PUBLIC CONSULTATION, supra note 123 and accompanying text
(the exclusion to credit shift under Pillar II of the OECD GloBE Proposal).
166 I.R.C. § 901.
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continues to claim the difference between the U.S. tax on the income and the tax imposed
by the source jurisdiction.167
U.S. taxpayers may avoid a current tax in the U.S. by operating or investing outside
the U.S. through a tax opaque, non-U.S. entity.168 The U.S., however, has enacted an array
of mechanisms to protect its claim to a share of the foreign source income in which U.S.
persons have an indirect interest through a non-U.S. corporation, including the CFC,169
passive foreign investment company (PFIC), 170 expatriated entity, 171 and now repealed
foreign personal holding company172 provisions. The CFC provisions even permit the U.S.
to reach across national borders to tax part of the income of CFCs to their U.S. shareholders
without any actual or constructive distribution from the CFCs to the U.S. shareholders as
a necessary requirement for the tax imposition. With respect to the hidden investment
capital of U.S. persons, the U.S. has also sought to enlist the assistance of non-U.S.
financial institutions in its quest to tax the income that capital generates.173
D.
Tax Base Allocation and Apportionment
Underlying any allocation or apportionment of an income tax base is an implicit
assumption that a base exists to allocate and apportion. While definitions of income for
tax purposes exist,174 the elements of any income tax base enjoy commonalities with all
income tax bases, but the details of inclusion, exclusion, and deduction differ across
167 I.R.C. § 904. For example, A invests in country X and earns $100. Country X imposes
a $10 tax on A’s income in X. The U.S. would impose a $30 tax on the $100 income from X but
allows A a tax credit of $10 (the X tax) and imposes a net tax on the X source income of $20. If the
X tax were $40, the U.S. tax credit for A would be limited to $30, the amount of the U.S. tax on the
income.
168 Tax opacity is characteristic of corporations under subchapter C of the I.R.C. and
contrasts with tax transparency of partnerships and other entities under subchapter K of the I.R.C. A
tax opaque entity is itself subject to the income tax while a tax transparent entity is not but its owners
are taxable on their proportional shares of the entity’s income, as if the owners received the income
from the source and in the manner that the entity received it. I.R.C. § 702(b). Non-U.S. business
entities that are included in the foreign entities list in Treasury regulation section 301.7701-2(b)(8)
are tax opaque, and the default classification of other foreign entities in which the entity’s owners
have limited liability is also tax opaque, but the owners of the latter group may elect tax transparency.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) (referred to as the check-the-box regulation). Both domestic and
foreign tax transparent entities may elect to be tax opaque. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). There also
are various hybrid entities such as regulated investment companies that are tax opaque entities but
are allowed a deduction for distributions to their shareholders so that they do not pay tax at entity
level. I.R.C. § 852.
169 See I.R.C. § 951 (U.S. persons owning 10 percent or more of the shares of a CFC include
their shares of Subpart F and GILTI income).
170 See I.R.C. § 1291(income recognition in respect of stock in PFICs). See also I.R.C. §§
1293, 1296 (current inclusion of PFIC income election and mark to market election).
171 I.R.C. § 7874 (tax on inverted entities).
172 I.R.C. § 551 (repealed 2004).
173
Under FATCA, non-cooperating foreign financial institutions lose the benefit of
withholding reductions on U.S. investments. See I.R.C. § 1471.
174 For example, an oft-cited definition for a comprehensive income tax base is the SchanzHaig-Simons’ definition where income is the algebraic sum of consumption plus or minus the change
in the taxpayer’s net worth from the beginning to the end of the tax measuring period. HENRY
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY
49 (1938). Only rarely, however, do jurisdictions include unrealized appreciation and depreciation
of property in their tax bases. The U.S. does not include unrealized appreciation and depreciation
generally but does include both for certain financial positions under I.R.C. section 1256, dealer-held
securities under I.R.C. section 483 and all property of expatriating taxpayers under I.R.C. section
877A.
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jurisdictions. For example, most U.S. states that impose an income tax use federal adjusted
gross income 175 as their point of departure for determining the base for the tax. 176
Nevertheless, state income tax rules are not uniform. Each state modifies the amount of
adjusted gross income to arrive at the income base upon which it imposes its income tax.177
Internationally, the components of income tax bases vary. While the U.S. includes
gains from the sale or exchange of property in the income tax base,178 Germany does not
tax gain on tangible personal property held more than a year or real property held more
than ten years.179 Thus, a U.S. citizen who is resident in Germany and sells property in
Germany might have no inclusion of gain from the sale of property in Germany but have
the gain included in their U.S. income for tax purposes without there being any difference
in the taxpayer’s economic income in Germany and the U.S. Certainly, tax systems have
tended to copy elements from other tax systems, 180 and tax rules have converged
considerably over the years so that computational differences between jurisdictions may
be smaller today than in earlier decades.181 Yet differences endure and a single common
definition of taxable income remains elusive. Since BEPS seeks to eliminate profit shifting
and base erosion, consistent definitions of profit and base are essential to pursue those
goals. Definitional disparities undermine the potential success of the OECD projects
because parties to any international agreements may be agreeing to a methodology but not
to the tax items to which it applies. The definitional disparities leave open the possibility
that even if an OECD project succeeds in gaining international consensus, its success in
application may remain incomplete.
Turning to the EU, in the hope of strengthening the single market, the updated
CCCTB proposal 182 aims to build upon the BEPS actions and effectively integrate the
reforms by harmonizing the approach of member states.183 This would be achieved through
a two-step plan: first, the proposal calls for the implementation of a Common Corporate
Tax Base (CCTB) in order to implement a cohesive, mandatory corporate tax base
definition and calculation system throughout the EU, and second, the CCCTB proposal
builds upon the CCTB with additional measures for tax base consolidation and
apportionment. 184 Commentators view the updated CCTB proposal as a significant
175

See I.R.C. § 62(a); Amy B. Monahan, State Individual Income Tax Conformity in
Practice: Evidence from the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, 11 COLUM. J. TAX L. 57 (2019).
176 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 143.121.1.
177 MO. REV. STAT. § 143.121.2-6.
178 I.R.C. § 1001.
179 Germany Individual Income Determination – Capital Gains, PWC (Feb. 13, 2021),
https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/germany/individual/income-determination [https://perma.cc/G9ZJ775H]. See also German Income Tax Act, (EStG) Einkommensteuergesetz in der Fassung der
Bekanntmachung vom 8. Oktober 2009 (BGBl. I S. 3366, 3862), https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/estg/BJNR010050934.html#BJNR010050934BJNG000208140 [https://perma.cc/JEX46BEZ].
180
See Infanti, supra note 7.
181 See Luis C. Calderon Gomez, Transcending Tax Sovereignty and Tax Standardization:
Three Questions, 45 YALE J. INT'L L. 191, 192 (2020).
182 The original CCCTB proposal was in 2011. Proposal for a Council Directive on a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM (2011) 121 final (Oct. 6, 2011).
183 Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Communication for A Fair
and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, COM (2015)
302 final (June 17, 2015).
184 See Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), COM
(2016) 685 final (Oct. 25, 2016); Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM (2016) 683 final (Oct. 25, 2016).
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improvement with respect to its focus on tax fairness and commitment to combating base
erosion, as it gives equal importance to non-taxation and under-taxation as it does to overtaxation. This compares to the 2011 CCCTB which was concerned primarily with overtaxation and reflected the European Commission’s pro-market and pro-business emphasis
in tax matters.185
Significant issues remain, however. Although harmonization envisions the
resolution of tax competition due to transparent tax rate competition, there is some
speculation that the proposal could in fact incentivize “factor-manipulation,” which would
allow artificial tax base shifting to continue.186 There is also concern that in leaving out
tax rate coordination, member states are not sufficiently constrained from engaging in
competition through corporate income tax rates to attract economic activity, 187 and
similarly, “[c]ountries may circumvent the common tax base by moving from allowances
to tax credits as incentives.”188
The CCCTB project has a less ambitious objective and focuses on replacing
transfer pricing guidelines with formulary apportionment.189 This approach presumably
requires uniform income computation rules to develop an income apportionment
formula. 190 Application of the CCCTB proposal to MNEs would have undercut the
argument that MNEs are at risk of multiple impositions of tax on the same income. The
CCCTB apportionment formula would provide predictable outcomes and assure that each
unit of income is taxable only in a single jurisdiction. However, Member States did not
agree to the apportionment formula. 191 The CCCTB proposal eliminated intangible
property from the formula. With intangible property, the most fluid source factor of
income apportionment removed from the formula,192 MNEs would have lost a principal
tool for increasing the effective income apportionment to low tax jurisdictions. Only to
the extent that the MNE has physical property, employees, or sales in a low tax jurisdiction
does the formula apportion any of the MNE’s income to the low tax jurisdiction.193
The CCCTB proposal is consistent with the assertion that representatives of MNEs
frequently make that a reasonable level of taxation under unambiguous tax rules is
acceptable as long as all MNEs are subject to identical and predictable rules so that none
gain a competitive advantage through the tax system. The GloBE project similarly aligns
well with assertions that there exists a concept of fair share or fair taxation. While the
concept of fair share or fair taxation underlies recent discussions of a minimum tax, it is
185 See Christian Valenduc, Corporate Income Tax in the EU, the Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and Beyond: Is it The Right Way to Go? 18 (ETUI, Working Paper
2018.06, 2018) (“[S]ince 2011, the Commission has been moving from a tax policy agenda that was
only ‘pro-market’ and ‘pro-business’ to a broader tax policy agenda that includes fairness and
combating profit shifting and tax avoidance.”).
186 See Maarten F. de Wilde, Tax Competition Within the European Union Revisited — is
the Relaunched CCCTB a Solution? 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 24 (2014).
187
Hungary has a 9 percent, Ireland has a 12.5 percent, and Lithuania a 15 percent
corporate rate, compared to France’s 32 percent rate and Germany’s 29.9 percent rate. Elke Asen,
Corporate Income Tax Rates in Europe, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org
/2020-corporate-tax-rates-in-europe/ [https://perma.cc/69EN-FERB].
188 See Valenduc, supra note 185, at 23.
189 Boer, Martin, A Few Comments on the CCCTB Directive 2-4 (Feb. 28, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2012276 [https://perma.cc/7CQZ-R6S6].
190 Id. at 5.
191 Id. at 8.
192 See 2011 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 17, at 14 (paragraph 21 of Preamble).
193 See id. at 49 (article 86). Cf. Ordower, supra note 33, at 386.
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elusive and political. It lacks meaning other than as a politically relative concept
supporting claims to a greater share of a limited resource. 194 The reasonableness of a
specific level of taxation should remain separate from the application of any nation’s tax
rules and the correct location for the imposition of the tax, that is, the question of which
nation may collect that correct amount of tax. The premise that some correct amount or
rate of taxation exists underpins all the BEPS iterations that conclude that MNEs ought to
pay more tax than they do currently. While a general notion of a universally correct level
of taxation may exist and each MNE and possibly each individual should be subject to that
level, some (or many) MNEs and individuals are not paying that correct level. Yet, the
BEPS projects are not geographically neutral in their approach to collecting the fair amount
of tax but conflate the fair tax concept with geographic determinations that the MNEs are
avoiding taxes imposed by the developed economies. 195 That approach politicizes the
concept of fairness rather than seeking consensus concerning the correct level of taxation
free from the political issue of which nation gets the revenue.196
V.
THE RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE POVERTY CONUNDRUM
Once OECD participants agree to an anti-profit shifting structure, MNEs in the
aggregate will pay additional tax. Whether residence, consumption, or another metric
becomes the measuring instrument to prevent profit shifting, income will be allocated so
that MNE’s can no longer concentrate revenue in low tax jurisdictions that are not
contributing more than a minimal amount to the production of the income. Allocation
factors such as labor measured by person-hours rather than wages,197 international market
sale value of resources rather than extraction value or some other value-added
measurement198 may direct a somewhat greater share of worldwide profit to less developed
economies. A minimum tax will limit the ability of less developed economies to trade their
power to collect taxes for investment. Under all structures under discussion internationally,
the developed economies are likely to enjoy the bulk of the reallocated or increased tax
bases and gain additional tax revenue.
History suggests that some developed countries will deploy the additional revenue
for the good of all residents while others will follow a course of concentrating benefits
through reduced tax impositions into the hands of the affluent under the premise that the
affluent create jobs for the less affluent members of society. 199 How the incremental
revenue is utilized, it is reasonably certain that little of it will find its way to international
development,200 and the disparity between rich and poor nations and their citizenries seems
likely to increase. Just as leveling of revenue among St. Louis County taxing districts to
smooth wealth disparities among districts on even such an essential resource as public
194

Brassey & Ordower, supra note 37, at 100-02.
Sarah Paez, Groups Urge U.N. Tax Committee to Reconsider OECD Unified Approach,
TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L (June 17, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayinternational/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/groups-urge-un-tax-committee-reconsider-oecdunified-approach/2020/06/17/2cmnh [https://perma.cc/FZ7V-GYWM].
196 See Brassey & Ordower, supra note 37.
197 Ordower, supra note 33, at 387-88.
198 Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 32, at 29-39.
199 See David Hope & Julian Limberg, The Economic Consequences of Major Tax Cuts for
the Rich (LSE Int’l Ineq. Inst., Working Paper 55, 2020). https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107919/1
/Hope_economic_consequences_of_major_tax_cuts_published.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CS6-GPEG]
(empirical study on effects of major tax cuts for the rich on income inequality, economic growth, and
unemployment).
200 Brassey & Ordower, supra note 37, at 102-04.
195
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education rarely if ever captures the center of attention in public debate,201 international
revenue distribution to level resource allocation internationally rarely if ever becomes the
center of tax reform debate internationally despite the absence of a moral, rather than
political, justification for such resource disparities. 202 Many resource and wealth
disparities are functions of the happenstance of serendipitous geographic location for some
populations.
The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic is likely to augment the numbers of homeless
individuals in the U.S. as unemployment renders large numbers of Americans unable to
meet their residential rent or mortgage obligations. 203 School closings have left many
children without adequate nutrition because they no longer receive the daily meals at school
on which they relied for basic nutrition. 204 The need for food, shelter, clothing, and
healthcare in the U.S. is great205 but the need is primarily a distribution issue. Since the
U.S. is a principal world food exporter,206 food resources in the U.S. should be adequate
for the population. Even the welfare states of Europe have residents in need of support for
basic needs. Poverty exists in all the OECD member states and it is inexcusable. On a
global scale, poverty in developed economies rarely compares with the absolute poverty
that plagues many undeveloped or developing economies.207 In some countries, people,
often children, die from starvation.208 Diseases like malaria that disable and kill many in
less developed countries could be controlled or eradicated given sufficient economic
resources and commitment. While fatal hunger is relatively absent in economically
developed countries, fatal hunger may be ubiquitous in some less developed countries.
Homelessness, shortages of clothing, and limited educational opportunities are all
prevalent in economically developed countries, as well as less developed and undeveloped
economies, but in developed economies the housing, clothing, and education shortages are
primarily a matter of resource distribution rather than lack of resources. In undeveloped
economies, the shortages are more likely to be structural.
201

See supra Part II.
See Ivan Ozai, Inter-Nation Equity Revisited, 12 COLUM. J. TAX L. 58 (2020).
203 See Glenn Thrush, Homelessness in U.S. Rose for 4th Straight Year, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/us/politics/homelessnesscoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/R2NQ-6F48].
204 Mary Kathryn Poole et al., Addressing Child Hunger When School Is Closed –
Considerations During the Pandemic and Beyond, NEJM.ORG (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2033629 [https://perma.cc/UJ5P-MF3P].
205
Facts about Poverty and Hunger in America, FEEDING AMERICA,
https://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-in-america/facts#:~:text=More%20than%2037%20million
%20people,to%20support%20a%20healthy%20life [https://perma.cc/E96J-FR5T] (last visited July
10, 2020) (37 million in the U.S. suffer from food insecurity).
206
Which
Countries
Export
the
Most
Food?
WORLD
ATLAS,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-american-food-giant-the-largest-exporter-of-food-in-theworld.html [https://perma.cc/HT5G-NAWF].
207
Global Issues, Food, UN, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/food/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9TBM-LRKP] (last visited July 10, 2020) (estimating 821 million people suffering
from hunger in 2018).
208 The World Counts estimates that 9 million people die each year from starvation. People
Who Died from Hunger, WORLD COUNTS, https://www.theworldcounts.com/challenges/people-andpoverty/hunger-and-obesity/how-many-people-die-from-hunger-each-year
[https://perma.cc/U9DG-QTYS] (last visited July 10, 2020). In 2015, it was estimated that 10% of
the worldwide population were living in conditions of extreme poverty. Decline of Global Extreme
Poverty Continues but has Slowed: World Bank, THE WORLD BANK (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/19/decline-of-global-extreme-povertycontinues-but-has-slowed-world-bank [https://perma.cc/77G5-ATAA].
202
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Poverty in the OECD countries is relative.209 Relative to many in the developed
countries’ societies or the OECD states in general, some residents have little wealth and
suffer by comparison with those who are affluent. But poverty in the developed world is
not absolute. 210 Like the U.S., each of the OECD countries probably has adequate
resources to eliminate the relative poverty in that OECD country by redeploying existing
resources, without receiving additional tax revenue from MNEs. Many less developed
countries could not address the poverty they have without substantial assistance from the
affluent countries, but the affluent countries have offered only nominal aid relative to their
gross national incomes211 and national budgets. Most devote less than one percent of their
gross national income to international development to provide relief from poverty.212
Under such circumstances, private, altruistic actors such as Bill and Melinda Gates
through their foundation213 and business interests wanting natural resources or inexpensive
labor drive development in nations suffering much absolute poverty.214 A non-affluent
country might seize the opportunity for private, inbound investment by supplementing the
competitive advantage of local low-cost labor with an agreement not to tax the investment
capital or the earnings from that investment. Zero tax, perhaps accompanied by other
investment incentives, may provide the nudge to the international investor to invest in that
non-affluent country rather than another non-affluent jurisdiction that does not offer
exemption from local taxation. If taxing the MNE might cause the MNE to take its
investment capital to another non-affluent country offering lower taxes or no tax,
relinquishing the potential tax revenue seems like an easy choice. Despite their
exploitation by low wages, such low wage employment for residents alleviates the absolute
poverty from which those newly employed residents previously may have suffered.215 If
child labor best meets the international concern’s labor requirements, children often work,

209 See Koen Caminada et al., Social income transfers and poverty: A cross‐country
J.
SOC.
WELFARE
(Apr.
2012),
analysis
for
OECD
countries,
INT’L
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227690060_Social_income_transfers_and_poverty_A_cr
oss-country_analysis_for_OECD_countries [https://perma.cc/ZBQ4-FDBG].
210 Brassey & Ordower, supra note 37, at 104.
211 See Gross National Income Data, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/natincome/grossnational-income.htm [https://perma.cc/Q7PX-Y22D] (last visited July 10, 2020) (“Gross national
income (GNI) is defined as gross domestic product, plus net receipts from abroad of compensation
of employees, property income and net taxes less subsidies on production.”).
212 Official Development Assistance as a Percentage of Gross National Income (GNI): Net
disbursement, all donors, OECD International Development Statistics, Volume 2018 Issue 1, OECD
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/dev-v2018-1-table3-en [https://perma.cc/9HZ9-RWNA] (last visited
Jun. 16, 2020).
213
Foundation
Fact
Sheet,
BILL
&
MELINDA
GATES
FOUND.,
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Foundation-Factsheet [https://
perma.cc/H7NF-XA6Z] (last visited July 10, 2020).
214 Fashion Victims- The Facts, WAR ON WANT, https://waronwant.org/fashion-victimsfacts [https://perma.cc/UC2H-PK8E] (last visited July 10, 2020) (clothing factories in Bangladesh
and India); John Vidal, How Developing Countries are Paying a High Price for the Global Mineral
Boom, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015
/aug/15/developing-countries-high-price-global-mineral-boom [https://perma.cc/7VP5-ATMF].
215 See Fashion Victims, supra note 214. In some instances, the populace of a low wage
country may suffer such exploitation from MNEs in low wages, long hours and poor working
conditions that it may have been better off before the investment with subsistence farming or even
such occupations as trash picking.
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perhaps without the knowledge of the MNE, to assist their impoverished families despite
international labor standards that outlaw child labor.216
The OECD projects, like U.S. worldwide taxation, might deprive the non-affluent
country of the opportunity to capture the investment with the assistance of tax concessions.
Even if the non-affluent country manages to secure the investment and, under notions of
value creation,217 the tax base distribution formula which allocates a significant share of
the income of the MNE to the non-affluent jurisdiction, that jurisdiction might not have the
necessary infrastructure to measure the MNE’s income, impose, and collect the tax. The
non-affluent country historically may have relied on VATs or targeted taxes, like natural
resource extraction taxes, for example, rather than more complex tax bases like an income
tax. The non-affluent jurisdictions may have an inadequate administrative infrastructure
for such a tax. The newly tax-base-enriched jurisdiction in some instances simply may rely
on or piggyback onto the computations that the affluent home country might perform. Even
in instances in which the non-affluent country relies on the tax infrastructure of developed
economies, local collection of the tax may necessitate additional tax collection
administration the country can ill afford. Collection may prove inefficient and open the
door to additional corruption exacerbating existing inefficiencies and corruption in the nonaffluent country’s tax infrastructure.
The non-affluent country could choose not to collect the minimum tax, leaving the
revenue on the table for the MNE’s home country to take, but that would seem foolish.
Persuading some non-affluent countries to collect tax which MNEs’ home countries
otherwise would collect may drive those countries to create unofficial and perhaps corrupt
schemes to aid the MNEs to avoid their home country taxes.218 Some MNEs might accede
to such schemes to meet competitors who already participate in such tax avoidance or even
evasion and were drawn to the schemes by the promise of enhanced profitability. The
result of the imposition of the GLoBE pillars in the end might mimic historical iterations
of tightened tax regulation being met with sophisticated tax planning that remains one step
ahead of the tax legislators and administrators and devises strategies of varying legality to
avoid new tax regulation.219
If the developed OECD economies wish to enrich affluent state coffers by seizing
additional tax revenue from MNEs, the OECD projects may begin to accomplish that goal.
If, on the other hand, the OECD membership is offended by the success of MNEs in
avoiding the relatively high taxes of the developed economies and has identified a “fair
tax” amount that each MNE should pay, without regard to which country receives the
revenue, the OECD projects also may begin to accomplish that goal. If, however,
216 See Emma Aisbett et al., Do MNCs Exploit Foreign Workers? 38-39 (Nov. 27, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Brookings Institution), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Aisbett-et-al._Brookings-draft-2019.11.26_Harrison.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4DMW-JZ5L]; Danny Zane et al., Why Companies Are Blind to Child Labor, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.
28, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/01/why-companies-are-blind-to-child-labor [https://perma.cc/RZ3VCNM4]; Sarah Boseley, Child Labour Is Never OK. But for Multinationals It Is an Outrage,
GUARDIAN (June 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/26/child-labour
-tobacco-fields-multinationals-life-chances-destroyed [https://perma.cc/P557-6DKM].
217 See Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 32, at 29-39.
218 See, e.g., OECD HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 12, at 24 (lack of effective
information exchange from tax haven jurisdictions limits timely application and collection of tax by
non-tax haven jurisdictions); I.R.C. § 1471 (denying benefits to foreign financial institutions that are
uncooperative).
219 See Ordower, supra note 42, at 48.
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distribution of the “fair tax” revenue in aid of international development to eliminate
absolute poverty and level resources globally is the goal of enhanced tax collections, as it
should be, fairer allocation of the tax base itself might do little toward that end. Instead,
uniform tax collection and tax revenue distribution would seem a better choice. The next
section imagines an international taxing agency applying uniform tax rules to collect
revenue and eliminate tax arbitrage opportunities available due to the multiplicity of taxing
jurisdictions.
VI.
AN INTERNATIONAL TAXING AGENCY FOR AN ECONOMICALLY
GLOBALIZED WORLD: ABANDONING MYTHICAL TAX SOVEREIGNTY
All base erosion projects require some compromise of tax sovereignty, a topic
overdue for more serious consideration insofar as sovereignty in taxing well may be a false
flag in the world of tax treaties, tax information exchange agreements, and tax blacklists
designed to coerce non-cooperative jurisdictions into becoming cooperative. The business
world has long accustomed itself to operating across international borders and within the
framework of multiple sovereign states. Income tax systems of nations participating in the
OECD Inclusive Framework addressing base erosion and profit shifting must converge to
smooth and eliminate systemic disparities so that base erosion in one state is not simply a
structural element of another. Lack of tax base uniformity may facilitate new base erosion
as taxing units adjust their bases rather than their rates to engage in tax competition. 220 A
minimum rate of tax requires uniformity of the base for the tax and uniform administration
of the tax to attain its goal, but existing minimum tax proposals fail to require the essential
uniformity. Each step toward uniformity requires nations to compromise their tax
sovereignty and accept a compromise position that may accommodate or follow another
nation’s tax rules. The ideal way to guarantee that uniformity of rules and administration
would be a single international agency to administer the common rules with powers to
operate independently of national borders. Measurement of income under uniform
substantive and procedural rules is essential but the determination of income source or
taxpayer residence would become matters of revenue distribution, not tax collection. The
international agency may collect the taxes and distribute them among nations under an
internationally determined formula that is not dependent on the determination of income
source or residence.
Much sovereignty is at stake in the BEPS and GloBE projects but voluntary
relinquishment of sovereignty is not novel. Nor does it represent a radical change from
historic practices during the 20th century. Following World War I, the League of Nations
emerged as a mechanism for international cooperation and resolution of disputes that
would avert future wars. It failed, of course, but the United Nations followed the next
world war. UN peacekeeping interventions have prevented some wars221 but the UN has
not spoken with sufficient authority to supplant sovereign decision-making that threatens
peaceful intercourse among nations.

220

See de Wilde, supra note 186, at 30 (“[U]nitary approach . . . reflecting inputs and
outputs is generally considered to produce less opportunity for engaging in artificial tax avoidance
operations.”).
221 Our Successes, UN PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-successes
[https://perma.cc/QD5Y-37BJ] (last visited June 18, 2020); Mano River Basin, 25 Years of
Peacekeeping, UN PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mano-river-basin-25-years-ofpeacekeeping (last visited June 18, 2020).
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Common economic interests have been somewhat more successful in securing
international cooperation. The World Trade Organization (WTO), 222 for example,
promotes international trade and provides a forum for the resolution of trade disputes and
represents a compelling example of international cooperation for common economic
interests.223 Even the U.S. has acquiesced in adverse decisions of the WTO concerning
anti-competitive practices and impermissible subsidies.224 Both the EU, which began as
an economic community to regulate and promote trade for the benefit of its members,225
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)226 were created during the twentieth
century. Each required ethnically and linguistically discrete countries to cede more or
perhaps less voluntarily in the case of the USSR considerable economic independence to
secure improved economic and trade relations beneficial for all member states. Central
planning in the USSR, government control over many aspects of daily life, slow economic
growth, and restrictions on individual liberties contributed to the eventual failure of the
USSR model, 227 while limited central government control, protections of individual
liberties and national independence, as opposed to EU common interests, in many nontrade related functions has worked with considerable success in the EU model. The UK’s
withdrawal from the EU228 and dissension with respect to several primarily non-economic
or trade issues including immigration 229 indicates that the EU model may require
adjustments for it to endure permanently without loss of additional member states.
Nevertheless, the willingness of nations to acquiesce in the authority of an international
and voluntary administrative body to promote common economic interests exists. On a

222 What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english
/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Y4S7-6DXU] (last visited July 10, 2020).
223 Martin Vallespinos, Can the WTO Stop the Race to the Bottom? Tax Competition and
the WTO, 40 VA. TAX REV. 93 (2020) (arguing that the WTO should police tax concessions because
they impact trade).
224 See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, WTO Boeing dispute: EU issues
preliminary list of U.S. products considered for countermeasures (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2162 [https://perma.cc/69Y9-SKAB];
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Notifies Full Compliance in
WTO Aircraft Dispute (May 6, 2020), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2020/may/us-notifies-full-compliance-wto-aircraft-dispute
[https://perma.cc/BK6W3Z7H]. See also Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, United States Tax Treatment for “Foreign
Sales Corporations,” WTO Doc. WT/DS108/36 (Mar. 17, 2006) (the U.S. repealed the grandfather
provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act and the ETI Act that were subject to compliance
proceedings); Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/23 (Nov. 26, 2001).
225 The History of the European Union, E
UROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/history_en [https://perma.cc/2QM3-FQGR] (last visited June 18, 2020).
226 See generally, Soviet Union, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com
/place/Soviet-Union [https://perma.cc/2C9R-VM4B] (last visited July 27, 2020).
227
See Numa Mazat, Structural Analysis of the Economic Decline and Collapse of the
Soviet Union, ANPEC (2016) https://www.anpec.org.br/encontro/2015/submissao/files_I/i3186e370d13d34b7043cb737da8d75390.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HE7-9JDQ]; Michael Ray, Why Did
the Soviet Union Collapse? BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/story/why-did-the-sovietunion-collapse [https://perma.cc/DW4A-443J].
228 Brexit – UK’s Withdrawal from the EU, EUR-LEX, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/content
/news/Brexit-UK-withdrawal-from-the-eu.html [https://perma.cc/Y2W9-65QW] (last visited June
18, 2020).
229 See, e.g., Pablo Gorondi, Hungary’s Orban Critical of EU Leaders on Migration,
Economy, AP NEWS (July 27, 2019), https://apnews.com/b89e682583014c7e8a1bf1cbb46e5dcf
[https://perma.cc/EKM9-59BJ].
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small scale, five economic powers have joined in a combined effort to reduce tax
evasion.230
In many countries, business interests, politicians, and the populace regularly
malign the taxing agencies while simultaneously looking to the taxing agency to subsidize
the activities and interests they favor. In the U.S., even members of Congress refer to the
tax laws as the “IRS code,” 231 implicitly assigning responsibility for taxation to the
administrative agency as if it, and not the legislature, were responsible for the tax laws that
the agency must enforce. Congress and other national legislatures have grown accustomed
to delivering indirect subsidies through the tax law rather than directly subsidizing
activities and interests.232 While an international taxing agency enforcing internationally
uniform tax rules under uniform administrative procedures and standards might continue
to be a subject of derision, it would remove taxation from the domestic political sphere and
allow it to serve its primary function of raising the revenue necessary to operate
governments, rather than as an indirect source of funding for private activities.
By separating taxation from domestic politics, international uniformity diminishes
the opportunism of targeted tax subsidies and requires discussion of budgeting for a subsidy
with a direct expenditure rather than the current indirect delivery through decreased tax
liability. Many tax subsidies currently are opportunistic and frequently provide taxpayers’
the opportunity to misdirect all or part of the intended subsidy.233 They result from the
exertion of influence by limited interests and appear in statutory language that is
deceptively general despite being targeted to the influential interests.234 Changing tax rules
under an internationalized system to subsidize specific business interests would require
international agreement and is likely to be far less common than such subsidies are now.
Uniform taxation of income without regard to source and divorced from the
distribution of the centrally collected tax revenue among nations eliminates the need for
bilateral or multilateral tax treaties, as well as TIEAs, except for the general agreement to
be part of the unified tax system and to acquiesce in the distribution formula. Where a
230 Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/compliance/jointchiefs-of-global-tax-enforcement [https://perma.cc/2LB2-RL7M] (last visited July 14, 2020).
231 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Who wrote the ‘IRS code’? Hint: It wasn’t the Internal Revenue
Service, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker
/wp/2015/04/13/who-wrote-the-irs-code-hint-it-wasnt-the-internal-revenue-service/
[https://perma.cc/P7KQ-GKG4].
232 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., TAX EXPENDITURES (2018), https://home.treasury.gov
/system/files/131/Tax-Expenditures-FY2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DF2-6K54] [hereinafter Tax
Expenditures].
233 See Henry Ordower, Capital, an Elusive Tax Object and Impediment to Sustainable
Taxation, 23 FLA. TAX REV. 625, 630-32 (2020). For contrary views approving the use of the taxing
authority for non-revenue functions, see, for example, David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nusim, The
Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L. J. 955 (2004) and Sara Sternberg Greene,
The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013).
234 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2; Subcommittee on Econ. & Consumer Pol’y, U.S.
House of Representatives, Lawmakers Question Mnuchin on Possible Opportunity Zone Abuse, TAX
NOTES TODAY FED. (June 24, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/opportunityzones/lawmakers-question-mnuchin-possible-opportunity-zone-abuse/2020/06/25/2cnd8?highlight
=opportunity%20zones [https://perma.cc/TN9Y-MRDA]; Brett Theodos, Jorge Gonzalez & Brady
Meixwell, The Opportunity Zone Incentive Isn’t Living Up to Its Equitable Development Goals. Here
Are Four Ways to Improve It, URBAN WIRE (June 17, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urbanwire/opportunity-zone-incentive-isnt-living-its-equitable-development-goals-here-are-four-waysimprove-it [https://perma.cc/K99C-A7CX].

90

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

[Vol. 12:126

taxpayer earns income will no longer determine to whom the income is attributable and
who has the taxing authority. Income from intangible property that is currently so abstract,
fluid, and challenging to source ceases to be so. If there is income, it is taxable under the
uniform rules of taxation. Outlier jurisdictions that do not join in the centralized taxing
regime are minimally problematic. Sourcing rules for the unified jurisdiction would
include a range of connections—property, labor, revenue (direct or indirect), and residence
of owners or beneficiaries. A taxpayer would be free from the agency’s taxing jurisdiction
only if they did nothing directly or indirectly outside the residence jurisdiction that has not
joined the centralized tax regime and the outlier country would receive no part of the
centrally collected tax revenue. An investment in any country that is part of the unified
taxing agency collection by an entity based in a non-cooperating jurisdiction would be a
sufficient connection with the unified taxing jurisdiction to render the taxpayer’s income
taxable by the unified agency.
Constructing uniform rules and assembling agreement will be a formidable task,
but the project would have the virtue of binding uniformity that current international
projects lack. When a country signs on to the agreement, it has little room to manipulate
the rules since it will delegate tax administration and collection to the independent
international agency in which all countries are represented.235 Robust related-party rules
will limit the ability of taxpayers to arbitrage progressive rates with multiple entities.236
Universal tax transparency so that a single tax would be imposed at the ultimate ownership
level might be most sensible but perhaps too difficult to administer.237 Mechanisms for
broad-based information reporting by financial institutions, vendors, and business
consumers are critical to enforcement, and a more extensive withholding system than
currently in place in most countries certainly would facilitate accurate reporting. Perhaps
most important would be an international, public education effort so that taxpayers
worldwide receive identical and accurate messages concerning the benefits of the global
system, its uniformity, and its system for currency translation to achieve economic
uniformity to address hyper-inflationary currencies. Supplemental to the global system
and beneficial to worldwide economic stabilization that should follow from the distribution
formula would be currency exchange rate stabilization and possible transition to a single
international currency.
For MNEs, a single tax collector and single computation would be likely as well
to facilitate a transition to a uniform international accounting and reporting system to
replace the awkward reporting split between the generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) that the U.S. uses and the international financial accounting standards (IFRS) in

235

Cf. Ordower, supra note 33, at 375-78.
Cf. I.R.C. § 318 (constructive ownership rules); I.R.C. § 267(b) (related parties for loss
denial). There are many other such provisions using a variety of thresholds for treating otherwise
separate individuals or entities as having common interests that limit tax separation.
237 Extensive tax transparency exists in the U.S. as the income of partnerships and limited
liability companies. See I.R.C. § 701; I.R.C. §1361 (for electing S corporations); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3 (non-U.S. entities that make election are taxable only to the underlying owners).
Commentators, including the author of this Article, have recommended full tax transparency for
corporations. See Henry Ordower, Preserving the Corporate Tax Base through Tax Transparency,
71 TAX NOTES INT’L 993 (Sept. 9, 2013). Modified transparency also exists. See I.R.C. § 851
(regulated investment companies); I.R.C. § 857 (real estate investment trusts).
236
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use in much of the remainder of the world.238 The U.S. finally might transition to IFRS as
has been proposed, but not finalized, by the Securities and Exchange Commission.239
VII.
REVENUE SHARES
One virtue of global tax administration under uniform tax rules is that taxpayers
are left with no place to hide from paying taxes. Taxation under this system is borderless.
Tax planners undoubtedly will continue to seek, and perhaps occasionally discover,
opportunities to diminish their clients’ tax liability, but borderless uniformity ideally
eliminates all opportunities to reduce taxes by redirecting income or income-producing
activity to other jurisdictions. Globally centralized determination and collection of tax
likewise precludes local political decision-making from impacting tax liability and
delivering benefits through the tax system.
The premise that a fundamental concept of fair taxation exists free from political
determinants underlies common global tax collection under uniform rules. “Fair share”
becomes a global rather than domestic concept. Each taxpayer should pay their “fair share”
relative to global, not national, revenue needs. A global “fair share” concept recognizes
that even economic activity that may seem local is not. Rather, under uniform taxation and
collection, global economic and social interdependency would be recognized universally
and could emerge as the ultimate marker of the 21st century. The COVID-19 pandemic,
worldwide commercial branding and manufacturing, 240 international terrorism 241 , and
cross-border intrusion into elections and the political process242 are only a few of the many
elements that demonstrate how inextricably intertwined nations have become.

238 See Lisa Weaver, The Wider Implications of Transitioning to IFRS—10 Things to
Consider, IFAC (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.ifac.org/knowledge-gateway/supporting-internationalstandards/discussion/wider-implications-transitioning-ifrs-10-things-consider#:~:text=The
%20transition%20to%20International%20Financial,reporting%20in%20the%20last%20decade
[https://perma.cc/67MM-E4Q9].
239 SEC Unanimously Approves Exposing Proposed IFRS Roadmap for Public Comment,
AICPA (Aug. 27, 2008), https://www.ifrs.com/updates/sec/SEC_approves.html [https://perma.cc
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The impetus to the OECD Action plans, 243 the EU’s list of tax haven
jurisdictions,244 and FATCA in the U.S.,245 relies on a more limited and domestic thesis.
The thesis is that MNEs and other taxpayers misdirect some of their income to low tax
jurisdictions to avoid paying the amount of income tax they should pay into the treasuries
of major developed economies. Under that thesis, the notion of fair taxation is relative and
location-specific. It is valid only insofar as it defines the amount a taxpayer should pay to
a specific developed nation’s treasury. The OECD framework purports to be more
global.246 but it emphasizes capturing additional revenue for the treasuries of the developed
economies. Failing enhancement of tax revenue for those developed economies, the
OECD’s leading member nations might lose interest in collecting additional tax from the
MNEs targeted by the BEPS Actions.
Rule uniformity and central global tax collection postulates an alternative to the
location-specific thesis expressed in the preceding paragraph. The alternative thesis is
more abstract and independent of location. It posits the existence of a global responsibility
to provide each individual with sufficient resources to secure a decent standard of living.
Whether that view arises from a universal human value system that demands a just world
without poverty or from a sense of self-preservation that foresees physical and economic
risks to those with wealth from those who are impoverished,247 the thesis requires that each
taxpayer pay a correct amount of tax that depends on the taxpayer’s characteristics. Those
characteristics might include the taxpayer’s ability to pay measured under the common
standard of the taxpayer’s income from all sources worldwide as compared with all other
taxpayers. Under such a thesis, the major developed economies might support a collection
of that fair share even if the additional tax does not augment their governmental coffers.
Both the OECD Actions and FATCA are designed to generate additional tax
revenue by redirecting income from its artificial location in a low tax jurisdiction to its
correct location in a higher taxed, major developed economy. Neither the OECD Actions
nor FATCA favors one higher tax jurisdiction over another insofar as neither redirects the
incidence of taxation as long as the rate imposed is sufficiently high. For example, the
BEPS actions would not redirect income from the Netherlands to Germany because both
countries impose a sufficiently high rate of tax, but BEPS might redirect income from
Ireland to Germany because the Irish corporate rate is only 12.5 percent. Similarly,
FATCA might include income from offshore investments in a U.S. taxpayer’s income but,
except under unusual circumstances where the tax is payable to a diplomatically restricted
country, 248 would allow the U.S. taxpayer a credit for the tax paid to the other
jurisdiction. 249 A common international taxing system with uniform rules and
administration similarly will produce more income tax revenue than is generated
243
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worldwide if current developed economy rates apply. Estimates of the amount of
additional revenue vary both with rates and assumptions.250 The amount of additional tax
revenue from preventing profit shifting251 or reducing the tax gap252 is not trivial even if
speculative.253 While developed economies do use their tax systems politically to deliver
a considerable array of incentives, it nevertheless would seem to be in their interests to join
a borderless tax consortium to promote fair and even-handed taxation of all participants in
the economy and to augment global tax revenue production. Political quibbling among
advanced economies, of course, might stymie agreement as it has on adopting even a
simple measure like the CCCTB.
With limited exceptions for a few developed economies like Ireland that use their
tax rates and structures to attract foreign investment, 254 the countries that rely most heavily
on tax rates and concessions to attract investment fall into two broad groups. One group
consists of countries with many poor, often absolutely poor, residents. Those countries
look to international investment for the basic development of infrastructure and provision
of human essentials and jobs. They tend to lack strong bargaining power for international
investment and readily offer privileges, including freedom from taxation, to international
investors.255 A second group of countries are the more traditional tax haven countries,
frequently island jurisdictions, with developed business or investment servicing
infrastructures without the need for substantial tax revenue to carry their infrastructures.
Some of the groups have significant tourist industries and raise revenue through
consumption taxes like hotel and meal taxes targeted at tourists. The issue for a borderless
uniform income tax is how to attract those countries to join the tax consortium.
For countries that rely on their low tax structure to capture international
investment, the revenue distribution formula under a borderless uniform tax has to place
these countries in a better position compared with their current position that relies on tax
incentives to attract investment. An initial offer of all incremental revenue from the change
to the borderless tax under an international tax administrator would be a good place to
begin. Before the economic downturn from the COVID-19 pandemic, developed
250
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economies generally have been able to maintain and perhaps even expand their own
infrastructures, including welfare benefit networks that address the relative poverty in
developed countries without significantly increasing tax revenue. While no nation admits
it can maintain the best that it ever had without a steady increase in tax revenue, such
revenue increases have been difficult to find. Anti-tax sentiment in many places has
contributed to the political unwillingness of legislatures to increase rates of tax. Decreased
rates to meet international tax competition and political pressure to deliver subsidies
through the tax system have been more common. As much as developed economies may
hope for additional revenue from successful international agreements to reign in base
erosion and profit shifting, those economies have not budgeted for increased revenue from
BEPS or any other international project. Thus, the incremental revenue from borderless
taxation is uncommitted and could be devoted to international development, elimination of
absolute poverty, and improved control of worldwide health threats.
The plan might suffice to persuade those non-affluent nations to cease trading low
taxes for international investment and to join the universal tax consortium. The
commitment to centralized taxation could make many nations less desperate for revenue
than they are today and place them in an improved bargaining position with international
investors. Relatively low wages and natural resources would leave many jurisdictions
attractive for international investment and those that are not would have greater revenue
needs and would get a larger share of the international tax revenue pool. Private, shortterm selfish interests might stop being the primary driver of development, enabling those
countries to identify and remedy their most acute needs. Improvement of living conditions
worldwide might likewise increase consumption and income that would yield even more
tax revenue. Rather than devoting that revenue to bulking up the treasuries of the
developed economies, the international consortium should be willing to commit that
revenue to international development, thereby enhancing the resources of the less
developed and developing world countries and broadening the consumer base into the more
distant future.256
Other traditionally low tax jurisdictions like tax havens might be more difficult to
enlist if they customarily offer low tax rates to enhance international investment servicing
business and do not have governmental revenue needs. For those countries, coercion may
be essential. Since the borderless system would be independent of income sourcing, those
jurisdictions would no longer be able to offer international investors freedom from taxation
on their investment assets. Most investors would have a sufficient connection with one or
more of the consortium countries to provide a basis upon which to tax their income under
the borderless system. Historical tax haven economies would simply lose the benefit of
offering low taxes.257
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Since the global tax will increase tax revenue, distribution initially should follow
a two-step formula. The first step would hold each country harmless from tax revenue loss
so that each country, following the transition, receives a share of tax revenue equal to its
revenue from income tax in the preceding year or over a rolling average of years, possibly
adjusted for inflation. This step preserves the status quo on revenue. While little doubt
exists that every country can claim great need for increased tax revenue to fund an
unlimited number of important projects in that country, those revenue needs are relative,
not absolute. Hence, the second step would require an evaluation that assesses nutrition,
housing, education, healthcare, and infrastructure needs of less developed countries and
development of a plan to ameliorate any deficits in all categories worldwide. The UN has
projects related to some aspects of need already, including hunger. 258 The remaining
revenue would be devoted to the gradual elimination of those deficits—perhaps addressing
life-threatening deficits first followed by improvement of living standards everywhere.
Amelioration costs would vary widely since they will remain a function of relative local
cost of goods and labor.
The method of distributing the incremental revenue may prove more challenging
than determining the amount to distribute to each country. Significant regional variations
of need contribute to the determination of the amount but distribution through national or
regional governments and agencies requires a national or local commitment to deploy the
funds as intended. Local corruption is likely to remain an impediment to the intended
development and retard progress toward the elimination of absolute poverty. Direct
international control of deployment of funds might be the best solution, but that would
require further relinquishment of national sovereignty, which quite possibly can endanger
international willingness to engage in the borderless tax project. Such control goes well
beyond the economically beneficial strategy of a uniform and borderless tax. It might
prove even more difficult to persuade nations to yield control over national revenue
deployment than to persuade them to become part of the borderless collection system.
International control over resource distribution intrudes further upon national selfdetermination. The global pressure to join a worldwide tax consortium and subscribe to a
fair tax and distribution formula might serve to moderate corruption where it becomes clear
that corruption is impeding intended distribution to diminish the incidence of local poverty,
as local residents begin to imagine fundamental changes in living conditions for them if
they organize to prevent corrupt actors from seizing the funds and preventing development.
The borderless system affords an opportunity to deploy a portion of the tax revenue
to fund a universal basic income (UBI). One country, several non-governmental agencies
and various governmental units have experimented with differing permutations of a UBI.259
Some UBIs are means tested while others simply distribute a basic sum to each individual.
The means-tested, recovery rebates under the CARES Act and subsequent legislation260 in
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2020), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2020/2/19/21112570/universal-basic-income-ubi-map
[https://perma.cc/5L6V-X493].
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the U.S. are a limited form of UBI.261 U.S. Democratic presidential primary candidate
Andrew Yang included a UBI in his platform.262 Some commentators have recommended
a universal basic income within national borders to eliminate poverty and distribute welfare
while respecting the dignity and autonomy of the individual.263 Some opponents of a UBI
worry that free money will disincentivize work but some argue that the very limited
evidence from existing experiments with UBI does not support that conclusion.264
Insofar as the uniform global tax requires taxpayers to report directly to the
international taxing agency without the intermediation of any national government, the
agency has the direct contact necessary to distribute funds to individuals. If the borderless
tax system includes everyone, without regard to income, in its database, it would be a
relatively simple matter for the agency to distribute funds directly to those whose incomes
fall below a geographically determined minimum amount. Such a system might be less
intrusive on national sovereignty than other types of control over funds, as the distributions
would be independent of national borders and tied only to the local cost of living and having
little to do with any characteristic that might be specific to any country. It is likely, for
example, that in many instances, especially those that may be historically arbitrary, two
individuals living a short distance apart on opposite sides of a border will have more similar
costs of living than two individuals living at a great distance from one another in the same
country. 265 The UBI could supplement direct distribution to national governments yet
remain substantially free from the risk of loss through governmental corruption.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes an international tax agency to administer a uniform
borderless income tax under uniform tax rules. It complements an earlier international tax
agency proposal that would have apportioned the income tax base, also determined under
substantially uniform rules, among nations to give a more meaningful share of the base to
less developed producing economies. This proposal expands the basic concept to collect
tax revenue centrally and distribute it among nations as it is needed. Needs for developed
economies would include the maintenance of their existing infrastructures including
welfare, while needs for less developed economies would include basic needs of the
populace—food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, and education. The proposal is aspirational,
Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 709 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of U.S. Code); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S. Code).
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2201 of the CARES Act adding I.R.C. § 6428.
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of course, but it is designed to induce readers to think more globally about basic needs and
ask questions like: what should my serendipitously wealthy nation be willing to renounce
so that my poor nation neighbor may provide essential services to its populace? The
concept of borderless taxation is utopian as it contemplates distribution of worldwide
revenue to provide basic human needs for a comfortable and productive life independently
of the happenstance of location of one’s birth.

